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ABSTRACT 
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Jennifer Norins, B.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
M.S., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 
Directed by Professor Robert Weiner 
 
As we become more firmly established in the 21
st
 century, the international 
system faces a number of increasingly more difficult challenges that pose threats to 
global security and human progress.  Among these challenges, water scarcity and failing 
states have each received prominent attention in both the academic and policy realms.  
Water serves a number of critical purposes for human survival and socio-economic 
activity.  The threat of water scarcity is becoming increasingly salient and the capacity of 
states to ensure water security, and other securities which water security supports, is 
being tested.  Fragile and failing states also occupy significant space in the discourse of 
international security, because as governless places, these states are linked to abhorrent 
civil violence, terrorism, trafficking of arms, and drugs and other illicit goods and 
services, all of which threaten regional and global security.  Using the case of Pakistan, 
this thesis will demonstrate the interconnections between water security and state 
strength, explicating the ways in which water security underpins economic development, 
v 
human development and security, and bolsters state institutional capacity.  As a state that 
exhibits both weak state features and water insecurity, Pakistan provides a demonstration 
of how the absence of water security makes tenuous the stability and capacity of an 
already fragile state.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
As we become more firmly established in the 21
st
 century, the international 
system faces a number of increasingly more difficult challenges that pose threats to 
global security and human progress.  Among these challenges, water scarcity and failing 
states have each received prominent attention in both the academic and policy realms.  
Water has been noted to be the major resource issue of the 21
st
 century (Homer-Dixon, 
1999), the key resource over which wars will be waged (Serageldin, 2009), and the 
degradation and decline of which is likely to be “the most underappreciated global 
environmental challenge of our time” (WorldWatch Institute, quoted in Barlow, 2007).  
Moreover, the salience of the unsustainability of current human exploitation of water 
sources has become difficult to ignore (Evans, 2010), as lakes and rivers are visibly 
shrinking and boreholes and tubewells dig deeper into the earth to access water.  Water 
serves as a critical element in nearly every socio-economic activity and is essential for 
sustaining biological life.  The imposing threat of water scarcity places immense 
pressures on the capacity of states to ensure water security for economic and human 
development.  For many places around the world, ensuring access to sufficient amounts 
of water is becoming an issue of high priority, and is aggravating tensions over shared 
water sources, both within and between states (Gleick, 2009).          
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Likewise, fragile and failing states occupy significant space in the discourse of 
international security, because scholars and policy makers identify such states as a 
persistent threats to regional and global security to which the international community 
has not be adequately able to respond (Brooks, 2005: 1164; Ellis, 2005: 135; Langford, 
1999: 59).  The apprehension with failed states has been that, as governless places, such 
states are unable to secure their borders, provide a security guarantee for their population, 
and meet their international obligations.  Failed and fragile states have been linked to 
terrorism (Piazza, 2008; Rotberg, 2004), trafficking of arms, drugs and other illicit goods 
and services (Patrick, 2007; Rotberg, 2002a, 2004), and persistent poverty (Collier, 
2007).  Failed states do not conform to the expectations of stateness and therefore defy 
many of the standard “conceptual and operational frameworks” of international relations 
(Langford, 1999: 59) regarding state behavior and the functioning of the international 
system.  
Individually, the consequences of water scarcity or of state failure are significant.  
Water scarcity frustrates the development potential of economies and hampers the well-
being of people living within the affected states.  Water scarcity intensifies intergroup 
animosities, heightens demands on states to compensate, and threatens food security and 
livelihoods.  Similarly, the process of state failure upsets the political, economic and 
social foundations of a state, creates environments of massive personal insecurity, and 
impedes human development.  The implications of water scarcity and state failure each 
exemplify the premise behind the theory of the security-development nexus, which 
asserts that security and development are mutually reinforcing, such that development 
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cannot occur in the absence of state and human security.  In the case of water, the 
inability of the state to ensure sufficient quantities of quality water to meet current and 
future water needs inhibits its development potential and negatively impacts other 
security issues.  The connection between insecurity and lack of development is also 
strikingly clear in failed states, where human and state security are dubious and economic 
and human development stunted. 
Yet, the literature lacks sufficient analysis of the interconnections between water 
insecurity and the causes and indicators of state failure.  Within the literature on water 
scarcity and water security, concession has been made regarding the increased difficulties 
facing failing states, there is minimal analysis of what those difficulties entail.  The state 
failure literature dedicates little attention to water issues, or even of the broader area of 
environmental stress.   In the major indices of state failure, the role of water is defined 
narrowly, measured only in terms of percentage of population with access to freshwater 
(Goldstone et al, 2004), if it is identified as a factor at all.  While this indicator provides a 
meaningful approach for determining the extent to which a country is experiencing water 
stress, it minimizes the critical role of water in underpinning human and economic 
development.   
Some research has been carried out that explores the causal relationship between 
resource scarcity and civil violence.  This work asserts that resource scarcity increases the 
structural imbalances between groups within a society, which amplifies antagonism 
between groups and increases the sense of a security dilemma (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 
Kahl, 2006).  However, there has been limited research focusing specifically on the ways 
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in which water insecurity undermines state strength and potentially provokes failure.  
Considering the mounting concern regarding intensifying water scarcity as well as 
increasing occurrences of water-related disasters, and considering the likelihood that such 
water-related challenges will occur in politically and economically weak states, this area 
of research is of major import.  Directly linking the consequences of water insecurity to 
the causes of state failure should redirect international attention to the importance of 
water for promoting human and state security.   
This thesis proffers an analysis of the interconnections between water insecurity 
and state failure.  Water is an essential resource, in that water acts as the basis for all life 
and serves as a critical input for almost every economic activity.  Water security, which 
can be defined as ensuring sufficient quantities of quality water to meet current and future 
water needs through the development of adequate infrastructure and institutions, 
underpins human and economic development.  Moreover, water security strengthens the 
political and economic stability of both the state and region.  In contrast, water insecurity 
undermines many of the critical political, economic and social factors that promote 
positive state-society cohesion and state stability.  Failing states are more likely 
experience the ill-effects of water insecurity, because they are plagued with weak 
institutional capacity and feeble political will to establish an efficient and equitable water 
management system that ensures the availability of water for human and economic 
development.  Such states may be tested to the point of failure when water-related 
challenges require the ability to quickly respond and adapt.   
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The case of Pakistan will be used to demonstrate the ways in which water 
insecurity undermines many of the critical political, social, and economic factors that 
promote state stability and development.  As a semi-arid to arid country, Pakistan already 
experiences water stress, due to inefficient irrigation systems and dwindling resources to 
meet growing demands.  Pakistan is also a state that has been on the brink of failure since 
its inception in 1947.  Heavily militarized, Pakistan prioritizes its external security over 
the development and security of the individuals living within its borders.  Pakistan has 
low levels of human development and increasing internal discontent.  In addition, the 
rising strength of the radical Islamist groups, the state‟s tacit support for terrorist groups 
and the Taliban, and its nuclear technology heighten international concerns about the 
potential threat that a failed Pakistan poses to global security.  In effect, Pakistan is one of 
the most insecure security states.  Given the confluence of both water insecurity and clear 
indicators of state failure, Pakistan provides a useful case for exploring the implications 
of water insecurity on failing states.   
 
Methodology 
To demonstrate the ways in which the phenomena of water insecurity and failed 
states interact, this thesis will involve a review and analysis of the literature on water 
security and water scarcity, water and conflict, state failure, and the security and 
development nexus.  Using secondary sources, chapter two will discuss the importance of 
water for development and the challenges facing countries world-wide in establishing 
water security.  In this chapter, a review and analysis of the literature will be presented 
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regarding the definitions of water security in terms of state security and human security, 
the nexus between security and development, and critical water security issues facing 
countries on a global scale, such as water scarcity.  In addition, chapter two will include a 
discussion of the concept of hydropolitics and the debate regarding the connection 
between water and conflict at both the international and subnational scale.   
Chapter three will consist of a review and analysis of the current literature on state 
failure, including a comparative analysis of major indices of state failure to identify the 
common factors that predict and distinguish state failure.  In addition, chapter three will 
present the thesis of how water security supports state strength.  This analysis will 
include a review of the current work that links environmental stress to civil violence, but 
will attempt to demonstrate that the interconnections between water security and state 
strength occur at deeper levels.  
Chapter four will present the case of Pakistan as a means of explicating the 
connection between water insecurity and state failure.  The chapter will first describe the 
political, economic and societal factors of the country that underscore why Pakistan has 
been consistently identified as a failing state.  The chapter will then discuss the extent to 
which Pakistan is water insecure, and the various external and internal challenges it faces 
in regards to its water security.  The chapter will end with an analysis that links the 
Pakistan‟s political, economic and societal challenges with Pakistan‟s water insecurity 
and will make assertions regarding the future of the state‟s stability if it continues to 
falter on establishing water security. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WATER 
 
Water is an essential element for biological life and acts as a critical input in 
nearly every socio-economic activity.  For centuries human civilizations have been 
appropriating and exploiting water resources for the purposes of development and public 
health.  Indeed, the ability of a country to obtain and manage fresh water resources for 
such purposes represents a critical aspect of state functioning and a matter of survival.  
However, in recent years the availability and quality of water resources have been 
noticeably compromised, an indication of rapid industrialization and unsustainable 
development.  Water scarcity has become a common threat for many countries around the 
world.  Water tables are dropping, some of the world‟s largest rivers to no longer reach 
their deltas, and industrial effluents and human waste are causing severe deterioration of 
water quality in rivers and streams (Clarke, 1993; Mitchell, 2007; Postel 1996, 2000).   
These challenges raise fears that the earth is running out of water.  
In actual fact, the earth is abundant in water.  Over 1 billion cubic kilometers of 
water flows on the planet, accounting for over 70% of the earth‟s total surface area 
(Clarke, 1993; Jackson et al. 2001).  Nearly all of this water is unusable or inaccessible 
for human consumption because it is either saline or stored in glacier icecaps (Jackson et 
al., 2001; Palaniappan & Gleick 2009).  Freshwater sources, such as rivers, lakes, and 
wetlands amount to less than 0.05% of the earth‟s water (Clarke, 1993; Jackson et al., 
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2001; Mitchell, 2007; Postel 2000).  Yet, even this small amount would meet all human 
and ecosystem needs if it was evenly distributed.  As water expert Sandra Postel explains, 
the global hydrologic system yields ample amounts of fresh water each year to sustain the 
world‟s population at its current level (Postel, 2000).  In absolute terms, therefore, there 
is no shortage of water.   
However, water is not uniformly distributed over time or geography (Clarke 1993; 
Gleick 1993, 1998; Grey and Sadoff, 2007; Postel, 2000).  While some regions of the 
world experience consistent precipitation throughout the year, other regions undergo 
extreme variations in weather patterns that make difficult the ability to store and manage 
water resources.  Geographic variation in climatic systems and the dispersion of rivers 
and lakes across the earth‟s surface create distinct regional differences in the availability 
of water resources.  Some regions of the world are rich in water resources, while others 
possess very little.  According to the Economist, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, 
Indonesia, and Russia comprise nearly 60% of global freshwater sources (For want of a 
drink, May 22, 2010).  In contrast, China and India, with over a third of the world‟s 
population, possess less than 10% of the world‟s water (For want of a drink, 2010).  
Given the rapidity of their economic growth, these two countries are struggling with 
identifying means of attaining their water needs.     
In addition to such regional variations in hydrologic endowments, the experience 
of water shortages is impacted by the level of demand placed on water resources.  
Though the total amount of water is immense, water is also a finite resource, meaning 
that the amount of water in the hydrologic system has been constant throughout the 
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earth‟s history (Palaniappan and Gleick, 2009).  The rising global population and 
increases in global consumption habits have made the fixed water resource pie smaller.  
However, the experience of water shortages at the human level is largely dependent on 
the individual‟s level of physical and economic access to water resources.   
Given the critical importance of water for all functions of society, water insecurity 
has the potential to undermine the political-societal stability of states.  Water insecurity 
refers to the lack of sufficient water to meet all requisite water needs as well as inability 
to adapt to major water disasters.  The constraints on water availability and water quality 
are becoming increasingly tight, as key regions of the world experience exponential rates 
of population growth, expanding consumption patterns, deteriorating water sources, and 
the uncertain impacts of climate change.  These global challenges are causing some 
countries to experience water stress, an extreme form of water insecurity.  These 
circumstances require societies to adapt rapidly.  However, many of the countries that 
will experience the greatest water stress also lack the governance capacities to adequately 
adapt to the dynamic disparity between supply and demand.  In these places, water 
insecurity will likely act as a critical risk factor that may cause weak states to fail. 
This chapter will focus on the relationship between water security and economic 
and human development.  To do this, the necessary background information will be 
presented on the importance of water for economic and human uses.  In addition, the 
concept of water security will be discussed.  The chapter will further elaborate on the 
connection between water security and development by discussing the concept of the 
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security-development nexus and then by reviewing two major areas of water insecurity: 
water scarcity and water-related conflicts.   
 
The Versatility of Water‟s Uses 
Water is the basis for all life and serves as a critical input for nearly every social 
and economic activity in which humans engage, including human health, food 
production, sanitation, energy production, and the manufacturing of many goods and 
services.  Water is also essential for the healthy functioning of ecosystems that support 
the planet (Postel, 2000).  Water‟s versatility of uses explains both water‟s social and 
economic import (WWDR 3, 2009), as well as the view that water is a source of 
contention (Gleick, 1993; Wolf, 1999).  Specifically, concern exists regarding the extent 
to which water use is a zero-sum game between various social, ethnic or economic 
entities (Gleick, 1993).  Water use is often discussed in terms of human or domestic use, 
agricultural use, and industrial or manufacturing use (Clarke, 1993; Gleick, 1998; Hunt 
2004; World WDR, 2009).  Contentions between groups may arise when one sector 
perceives another sector as limiting the overall quantity and quality of a shared water 
source.  This section will present the basic discussion regarding water‟s versatility of 
uses, including human use, agricultural use and industrial use, and the relationship 
between water development, economic development and human security. 
Water for human use represents the most essential function of water.  Human 
bodies are composed primarily of water, and therefore human survival requires a basic 
amount of water to replenish fluids that are lost through respiration, excretion, and 
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evaporation from the skin (Gleick, 1996; Hunt, 2004).  Because of the critical importance 
of water for human survival, water has been identified as a basic human right (Gleick, 
1996; Human Development Report 2006; Palaniappan, 2009).  Yet, approximately one 
billion people do not have proper access to safe drinking water, despite efforts to 
decrease this number by 2015 (Human Development Report, 2006; Jackson et al, 2001; 
Palaniappan, 2009).  Over the past two decades there has been discussion about 
establishing a minimum water requirement for domestic use as a way of addressing the 
disparity between the absolute necessity of water and the number of people worldwide 
who lack adequate supplies of water for their basic needs.  The suggested estimates 
fluctuate depending on what activities are included in the concept of domestic use and 
when the estimate was offered (Clarke, 1993; Human Development Report 2006; 
WWDR3, 2009).  Gleick (1996) has provided one of the most cogent assessments of the 
amount of water required to adequately support an individual‟s health and overall well-
being.  In reviewing both the physiological needs and the regional and national variation 
in the amount of water used for drinking, basic sanitation, bathing and food preparation, 
Gleick (1996) offers a basic water requirement of a minimum of 50 liters/person/day.  
Water for sanitation and personal hygiene comprises the bulk of Gleick‟s assessment of a 
basic water requirement, representing 35 liters/person/day, while water for drinking 
accounts for five liters (Gleick, 1996).  As will be discussed later, the actual amount of 
water appropriated for domestic use varies by country, depending on its level of 
development (Clarke, 1993; Gleick, 1996; WWDR 2009).   
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While water for human use has been recognized by many as the most critical of 
water‟s functions (Gleick, 1996; Postel, 2000; Watkins, 2006; WWDR, 2009), water is 
also a necessary input in nearly all economic activity, including agricultural production 
and manufacturing and industrial activities.  Of the various economic sectors, agriculture 
consumes the largest percentage of water, averaging 70% of global water use and 
accounting for at least 90% of water withdrawals in many developing countries (FAO, 
Water at a Glance; Wolf, 1999; WWDR-3, 2009 ;).  Countries dedicate so much water 
resources to agriculture out of necessity, because it bolsters food security and ultimately 
human development.  Although humans require approximately five liters of water a day 
for hydration, between 2,000-5,000 liters of water is needed to produce an individual‟s 
daily food intake (FAO, Water at a Glance).  In the early 1990‟s, Clarke indicated that 
1000 cubic meters of irrigated water were required to produce one ton of plant growth, 
and that watering crops required “3300 cubic kilometers of water a year – roughly six 
times the requirement for industrial and domestic uses” (1993: 27).  His estimates remain 
current approximations for the amount of water used to produce grains and other cereals 
(FAO.org).  Meat and dairy products are considerably more water-intensive than other 
agricultural products; the Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that 
approximately 16,000 liters of water is employed in the production of one kilogram of 
grass-fed beef (FAO.org).   
The high proportion of water input per agricultural unit reflects the amount of 
water lost during the agricultural process.  While irrigation significantly increases crop 
yields by over 100% (FAO Water at a Glance ), inefficiencies in some irrigation methods 
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result in substantial water loss.  According to Postel (1997), many farmers irrigate their 
fields by flooding or channeling water across their crop area, which uses excessive 
amounts of water and often results in water-logging and salinity.  These two related 
problems compromise the fertility of the land by washing out necessary nutrients in the 
soil and leaving a layer of salt after the water evaporates.  Leaks in irrigation pipes and 
unlined canals also result in unintended water loss.  Postel (1997) notes that the 
efficiency of irrigation systems worldwide is less than 40%.  In addition, nearly half of 
the waters employed in irrigation are lost due to the process of evapotranspiration 
(Jackstone et al. 2001:1035), which occurs when water evaporates off of plant life and 
returns to the environment in the form of CO2.  Thus water used for agriculture is 
ultimately consumed, because it is withdrawn from the immediate hydrologic 
environment and cannot be employed by other users (Palaniappan  and Gleick, 2009; 
WWDR-3, 2009).  
 Industry represents the final major sector for which humans appropriate water. 
Overall, industry and manufacturing account for 10-20% of water resource use, though 
amounts vary by industry (Hunt, 2004; Postel, 1997).  Industrial use of water comprises 
both direct and indirect use.  Direct uses of water for industrial activities include the 
exploitation of water as an input or as part of the processing of the manufactured good or 
service.  For example, producing a ton of steel requires nearly 300 tons of water (Postel, 
1997:136).  The production of beverages like Coca-Cola uses at least 2.5 liters of water 
for one liter of refreshment (Coca-Cola, 2008), though this estimate likely does not 
account for the amount of water used in the production of other primary ingredients, such 
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as sugar cane.  Energy production, such as in nuclear power plants or geothermal plants, 
require enormous amounts of water as a cooling agent (Hunt, 2004).  Indirect use of 
water includes the contamination of local water sources due to industrial effluents 
(Clarke, 1993; Hunt, 2004).  While much of the water that serves as a direct input to the 
manufacturing of the good or service is returned to local hydrologic environment, 
industrial pollutants significantly degrade the quality of the water.  Clarke (1993) 
estimates that 450 cubic kilometers of waste water are discharged into rivers and streams 
each year, which further requires over 6000 cubic kilometers of fresh water to cleanse the 
system. 
Variations in aggregated water use across countries are huge.  For example, the 
per capita domestic water use in the United States is over 575 liters per day, while per 
capita water use in Germany is below 200 liters per day, and in most developing and 
underdeveloped countries the level is below 50 liters per day (Watkins, 2006).  These 
variations reflect differences in the availability and accessibility of natural water 
resources, as well as the country‟s level of economic development.  Arid and semi-arid 
countries typically withdraw more water than countries in more temperate or tropical 
climates (WWDR-3), particularly for food production.  In addition, countries that are 
heavily reliant on the agricultural sector appropriate more water for agricultural purposes, 
while industrialized countries apportion 50 to 80% of their country‟s water budget for 
industry and manufacturing (Postel, 1997; WWDR-3).  As countries move toward more 
industrialization, decisions are required as to how to balance competing water needs.   
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Water Security as a Prerequisite for Development 
Given the import of water as an input in economic activity, a clear link arises 
between water infrastructure development and economic development (Grey and Sadoff, 
2007; WWDR 2009).  Since the earliest civilizations, societies have established formal 
and informal systems to utilize natural waters to meet their needs, including irrigation 
systems, cisterns and water harvesting systems, and large scale dams and reservoirs 
(WWDR, 2009).  The inconsistencies of the hydrologic cycle and the variable 
distribution of rain and surface waters required societies to develop mechanisms for 
accessing, storing, and distributing water for food production and other basic uses 
(Clarke, 1993; Hunt, 2004).  As populations grew and economies expanded, planners and 
policy makers recognized that the development of adequate water infrastructure was 
critical for the viability and progress of the country.  For example, in 1909 William 
McGee, past Secretary of the US Inland Waterways, argued that the proper control of 
water and the establishment of water management systems would result in vast savings 
and improved economic development, including cheaper energy production, improved 
river navigation and transportation, and increased farm production (McGee, 2010: 90).  
McGee‟s foresight into the value of water resource management as a tool for national 
economic development creates a foundation for placing water as a priority for national 
security.  
More recently, World Bank economist David Grey and his collaborator Claudia 
Sadoff (2007) argue that the ability or inability of societies to establish infrastructure and 
institutions to manage water resources distinguishes states as being industrialized or 
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underdeveloped.  For Grey and Sadoff, water infrastructure and institutions represents a 
fundamental foundation for water security and a driver of development.  Most definitions 
of water security focus on ensuring adequate quantities of water, in the quality necessary, 
to meet all current and future needs, in a manner that protects and enhances the 
ecosystems which support the planet (Global Water Partnership, www.gwp.org; Gleick 
1998; Postel, 2000).  Grey and Sadoff expand upon the definition to address the potential 
destructive nature inherent in water, asserting that water security also encompasses 
enjoying “an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and 
economies" (2007: 547-548).  Given that societies have limited ability to stipulate the 
types or intensity of water-related risks that they might endure, Grey and Sadoff‟s 
definition implies that water security encompasses the availability of resources and the 
capacity to manage resources and adapt to risk and catastrophe.   
Water-related risks are largely determined by a society‟s hydrologic environment, 
which either advantages or disadvantages societies in their development potential (Grey 
and Sadoff, 2007).  Societies with easy hydrologic legacies benefit from predictable and 
consistent rainfall as well as reliable and easily accessible river flows.  Such societies 
require minimal infrastructure and water management systems to ensure water security 
(Grey and Sadoff, 2007).  These societies have been able to make early investments in 
developing systems that maximize the utility of their water resources to propel economic 
and societal development.  In contrast, societies with difficult hydrologic legacies face 
extreme variation in availability of water resources and unpredictable rainfall (Grey and 
Sadoff, 2007); such societies may be in low-land coastal areas prone to flooding, or arid 
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and semi-arid climates where rainfall is sporadic.  For societies with difficult hydrologic 
legacies, the need for water infrastructure is huge (Grey and Sadoff, 2007).  However, 
these societies tend to have lower capacity to invest in water infrastructure and 
management systems, thus remaining vulnerable to their hydrologic environment.  Grey 
and Sadoff (2007) assert that societies that have been disadvantaged with difficult 
hydrologic environments have been caught in a hydrology-poverty trap in which the 
inability to establish water infrastructure constricts the ability to establish a secure basis 
for economic development. 
For example, the lack of sufficient water infrastructure in Ethiopia makes the 
country significantly water insecure, despite possessing one of the major tributaries of the 
Nile.  Ethiopia‟s hydrologic environment is highly variable and often extreme, with the 
possibility of droughts occurring every five years (Grey and Sadoff, 2007).  The inability 
to prevent or quickly rebound from such extreme water-related disasters has resulted in 
an estimated 38% loss to Ethiopia‟s GDP (WWDR-3, 2009).  Other countries, like Kenya 
and Mozambique, have similarly experienced significant economic losses as a result of 
insufficient infrastructure and management systems to handle extreme hydrologic events 
(WWDR-3, 2009).  Such examples exemplify the connection between a country‟s level 
of water security and its ability to manage the economic, social and environmental 
implications of water shortages.  Until a country is able to establish what Grey and Sadoff 
(2007: 561) call a “minimum platform” of water infrastructure and institutional capacity 
to secure their current water needs and minimize the effect of extreme water events, the 
country will not be water secure.  
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For decades, countries have invested heavily to develop water infrastructure for 
storage and distribution, in order to ensure adequate supplies of water to support growth 
in the agricultural sector and overall economic development.  Such investment has often 
been pushed by the World Bank and other international donors as part of countries‟ 
poverty reduction strategies.  Sandra Postel (1996) reports that the development of large 
scale dams has been exponentially high, reaching over 40,000 in 1996.  The development 
of reservoirs, irrigation systems, barrages and other water projects has allowed countries 
to increase their agricultural productivity, and has provided additional means of energy 
generation (WWDR-3, 2009).  While major water projects have provided many positive 
benefits for economic development, the construction of dams is also highly disruptive to 
the local communities and to the ecological system (Postel, 1996; 2000).   Water projects 
change the nature of the river flows and qualities, impacting entire ecosystems which rely 
upon it (Postel, 2000).  Moreover, large water projects require the relocation of entire 
communities, or create negative consequences due to loss of livelihood or food sources.  
Therefore, establishing water infrastructure to ensure state water security can threaten 
human security. 
 
The Security-Development Nexus 
The idea that water security provides a foundation for development is based on 
the theory of the security-development nexus.  This concept presumes that security and 
development are mutually reinforcing, in that security will be continually threatened in 
the absence of development, and development will be hindered in the absence of security.    
19 
The theory of the security-development nexus has been evolving steadily since the 
concept of human security was introduced by the UNDP‟s 1994 Human Development 
Report.  Responding to the increased incidence of civil wars and violent conflict within 
states at the end of the Cold War, the Report outlined the need for new paradigms for 
security and for development that were human-centered rather than being state-centric. 
Moreover, the rise in civil violence and instability made salient the incompatibility of 
economic development, political instability and violence (Collier, 2007; Stewart, 2004).  
Introducing the concept of human security, the authors of the 1994 Human 
Development Report sought to remind the international community that the United 
Nations was established with a broad understanding of security.  The idealist vision set 
out by the international community established that international peace and security 
depends on peaceful and cooperative relations between states, the recognition of 
fundamental human rights and human dignity, and a concerted effort to “promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”(United Nations, 1947).  Rather 
than focusing on traditional security threats such as external incursions on territory, the 
concept of human security emphasizes the promotion of the individual and her protection 
against “the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression” (Human 
Development Report, 1994:3). 
The concept of human security encompasses a broad range of security concerns 
that directly impact the well-being of individuals.  An obvious human security concern is 
personal security from state-initiated violence and repression, from ethnic-based 
violence, from criminal activity, and from domestic abuse (Human Development Report, 
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1994: 30).  However, the concept of human security also incorporates economic or 
livelihood security, health security, food security, and environmental security 
(Commission on Human Security Report, 2003; Human Development Report, 1994).  
This expansive operational definition of security emphasizes that human well-being 
depends upon multiple interdependent factors.  Economic insecurity, in the form of 
unemployment or insufficient income, compromises the individual‟s food security or 
health security.  Moreover, environmental insecurity, such as water scarcity or excessive 
air pollution, undermines public health, food security, and livelihoods.  By defining 
security in terms of human dignity (HDR, 1994), freedoms and opportunity (Barnett et 
al., 2010), and equity and justice (HDR, 1994; Commission on Human Security, 2003; 
Nsaih-Gyabaah, 2010), the concept of human security requires a development paradigm 
that advances human potential and improves the quality of life of the most vulnerable.   
The traditional development paradigm primarily concerns national economic 
growth, and delineates a specific trajectory by which countries progress from 
impoverishment to affluence (McMichaels, 2008 ;Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2010).  In this 
framework, the ultimate objective of development remains on improving standards of 
living (McMichaels, 2008), however, such progress is viewed as an automatic outcome of 
economic growth.  Moreover, given its Euro-American heritage, traditional conceptions 
of development focus on competitiveness in the global market, industrialization, and 
utilizing resources to maximize profits (McMichaels, 2008; Thomas, 2001).  The 
traditional development paradigm has been criticized for being narrow (Stewart, 2004), 
ethnocentric (McMichaels, 2008; Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2010), exploitative (Thomas, 2001), 
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and increasing the inequalities between the rich and poor (Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2010), thereby 
undermining human security rather than promoting it.  
The human-centered development presented by the 1994 Human Development 
Report supports human security because it prioritizes human well-being and quality of 
life.  Embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (2000), human development 
concentrates on eliminating poverty and hunger, improving human health and life 
opportunities, and expanding human freedoms (HDR, 1994; Barnett, Matthews, and 
O‟Brien, 2010).  The new paradigm offered by the Human Development Report also 
emphasizes that development should be sustainable, so that the opportunities for future 
generations are not limited and the natural systems that sustain the planet are maintained 
(HDR, 1994).  Sharing objectives and foci, human security and sustainable human 
development are mutually reinforcing; stunted human development undermines an 
individual‟s security, while human insecurity can likewise hamper the individual from 
fully exercising her right to develop.  As Frances Stewart notes, “if we take a more 
utilitarian approach to the definition of development – that it furthers human happiness – 
insecurity has severe adverse affects” (2004: 4) 
The interconnections between human security and human development extend to 
support state security and overall development.  Obvious connections have been 
established between the level of human development and level of economic development.  
The Human Development Reports assess countries on a number of variables measuring 
different aspects of human development, such as educational attainment, poverty rate, 
political freedom, gender equality, and quality of health.  The Reports demonstrate that 
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countries with higher levels of human development also report higher GDP/capita than 
countries with low human development.  The link between human security, state security 
and development is further demonstrated through the work of economist Paul Collier and 
his colleagues (2004, 2007), who have researched the impacts of civil war on economies, 
as well as through the work of Homer-Dixon (1999) who explored the processes by 
which resource scarcities induce intergroup violence.  In addition, political and social 
unrest can occur when enough people experience threats to their economic security and 
overall well-being that they perceive result from the inability of the state to fulfill its 
social contract (Stewart, 2004).   
Water security clearly bridges state security concerns and human security 
concerns, and interconnects security with economic and human development.  At the 
state level, securing sufficient water resources is critical to ensuring food production and 
supporting industry, thereby ensuring the economic viability of the state.  Water 
insecurity jeopardizes economies that are primarily reliant on their agricultural sector, 
though countries that utilize hydropower energy sources are also more vulnerable to 
water shocks than countries that rely on other energy sources (Gleick, 1993).  As noted 
by Grey and Sadoff (2004) and others (Clarke, 1994; Hunt, 2004), the development of 
water resource management systems forms a critical basis for economic development of 
states and supports the formation of other sectors.  
Yet, importantly, water represents the fundamental basis for human development 
and therefore water security exemplifies human security.  Water security at the human 
level is defined as having access to improved water sources, such as having a household 
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connection, or having access to a public standpipe, a protected well or spring within one 
km walking distance from their residence (Palaniappan, 2009).  It is assumed that access 
to improved water sources enables an individual to obtain the minimum basic water 
needs (20-50 liters) for personal consumption and domestic use (Gleick, 1996; Watkins, 
2006).  However, nearly one billion people, primarily in developing countries, have 
limited access to clean drinking water, and 2.6 billion lack basic sanitation (Palaniappan, 
2009; Watkins, 2006) , which means they use contaminated waters for bathing, 
laundering their clothes, and other domestic uses.   Moreover, “improved water sources” 
does not guarantee that the water is safe for human consumption (Palaniappan, 2009).  
Lack of clean water causes water-related diseases, which are a primary cause of death for 
millions of adults and children in developing countries (Gleick, 1996; Hunt, 2004; 
Palaniappan, 2009; Watkins, 2006; WWDR, 2009).  Palaniappan (2009) explicates the 
negative impacts of water insecurity on children, expressing that lack of clean water 
impedes cognitive and physical development, resulting in wasting and stunting.  In 
addition, water insecurity negatively impacts livelihoods and food security, and 
exaggerates gender inequalities.  In many rural areas, women and children have to walk 
miles each day to collect water, often from contaminated sources (Watkins, 2006).  Such 
labor detracts from other productive activities and educational attainment (Watkins, 
2006), thereby impeding the full economic potential of a given country.    
The human security paradigm recognizes that human impoverishment and 
insecurity are outcomes of structural inequalities (HDR, 1994; Watkins, 2006).  In the 
case of water, structural inequalities play an influential role in creating human-level water 
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insecurity.  An individual‟s financial resources and power determines water access and 
water use, even in times of water shortages (Watkins, 2006).  Most individuals living in 
wealthy countries, along with the urban middle and upper classes in developing countries, 
have unlimited access to water within their homes.  According to the World Water 
Development Report, approximately half of the world‟s population had piped connection 
to water within their homes or on their property in 2006 (WWDR-3, 2009).  Such ease of 
access permits excessive use, particularly when water is not priced at its full value.
1
  In 
contrast, the process of having to walk far distances or wait in long lines at public wells, 
the daily routine for millions of people, automatically limits the amount of water one can 
feasibly use.  In addition, the poor must pay exorbitant amounts for bottled water, or use 
polluted sources.  Political and institutional structures often discriminate against the poor, 
frustrating their ability to secure their basic water needs.  Public utilities in many 
developing countries “are failing the poor” because of restrictive policies on 
qualification, inefficient and unaccountable management, and inequitable pricing 
(Watkins, 2006:10).   
The implications for water insecurity at the human level are significant for the 
economic and societal viability of states.  As intimated, water insecurity significantly 
hampers human health and well-being, which translates to large costs for public health.  
Water insecurity also creates losses to overall economic productivity due to disease, poor 
nutrition, and women‟s hours spent collecting water.  In addition to the economic 
                                                 
1
 Pricing of water is a huge area of debate among policy makers and academics concerned with sustainable 
water use.  Proponents of water as a basic human right fear that the economic valuation of water will result 
in intensified disparities between water haves and have-nots.  Proponents of water as an economic good 
proffer that placing economic value to water will promote water conservation.  To address the potential for 
water marginalization, some proponents of water as a commodity recommend some subsidies for the poor.   
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impacts, the insecurities caused by a lack of freshwater can trigger intergroup animosities 
that result in violent conflict at the local level (Wolf, 1999), as well as dissatisfaction and 
resentment toward the state.  The Millennium Development Goals have attempted to 
persuade the community of sovereign states that investments in human development, 
such as ensuring human water security, promotes overall stability and growth.  
 
The Determinants of Water Insecurity 
 
Up to this point, we have discussed the concept of water security, and presented 
the interrelationship between water security and economic and human development.  The 
goal of this section is to describe several factors that can lead to water insecurity.  One of 
the greatest challenges to ensuring water security is the looming threat of water scarcity.  
Water scarcity denotes the physical and economic gap between the actual water 
availability and the amount of water needed at a per capita rate.  The potential for water 
shortages presents a serious threat to human health and well-being, as well as a critical 
challenge to the economic viability of states and their capacity to cope with such 
environmental stress.  Water scarcity can be induced by natural factors, such as arid 
climates, but most often, water scarcity results from excessive exploitation of water 
resources by human societies (Gleick et al. 2002; Postel, 2000).  Human consumption 
patterns have expanded rapidly in the past hundred years, and much of the development 
has depended on the availability of water for agricultural production, energy production 
and other uses.  Substantial evidence suggests that we are reaching a crisis point in 
regards to water, as Sandra Postel notes, "over the past quarter century, global per capita 
water supplies have declined by one-third and 1.7 billion people in developing regions 
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are currently experiencing water stress… If current trends persist, as many as 5 billion 
people could face such situations by 2025" (Postel, 2000:8).   
In his classic book Environmental Scarcity and Violence, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
(1999) proposes that natural resource scarcity derives from three major forms of 
imbalances: when supply is diminished or degraded, when demand overwhelms supply, 
and when structural forces of society result in uneven distribution of the resource (48).  
These three sources of scarcity often interact to intensify the experience of resource loss.  
The three sources of scarcity represent different theoretical perspectives about the 
primary cause.  Supply-induced scarcity corresponds to an ecological/natural science 
perspective that focuses on the hydrological environment and the effects of climate 
change.  Demand-induced scarcity reflects neo-Malthusian assumptions that population 
growth will place undue strain on the capacity of the environment and society to manage 
need.  Finally, the view that scarcity results from imbalances in the structure of society 
characterizes a neo-Marxist theories on political economy.   
Supply-induced scarcity relates to the disparity between the actual quantity of 
water available within a region and the rate at which these resources are depleted 
(Cooley, 2009). Supply induced scarcity can occur as a result of droughts, overdrawing of 
underground aquifers, restricted flow from an international river, or from excess 
pollutants that make available water unusable.  Environmentalists predict that climate 
change will engender major supply-induced water scarcities, which will also likely 
increase water demands (Cooley, 2009; Jackson, et al., 2001).  Since the late 1980‟s, 
scientists have been investigated in potential effects of human activity on the earth‟s 
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atmosphere and ecosystems.  Although the topic is much debated, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has annually disseminated findings that suggest that the 
impact on the atmosphere is huge, and will result in major changes in the world‟s 
climates (Cooley, 2009).  The warming of the climate systems, and the subsequent 
warming of the ocean temperatures, are producing and will continue to produce 
significant changes in the world‟s hydrologic environments.  The projected changes 
include increases in precipitation in regions above 30  latitude, decrease in precipitation 
in arid and semi-arid regions, changes in the timing and amount of surface water run-offs, 
increased likelihood of extreme weather and water-related disasters, and so on (Cooley, 
2009; Grey and Sadoff, 2007; Mitchell, 2007).  Extreme water-related disasters pose a 
significant security concern because they occur unexpectedly, and require significant 
resources to ameliorate the consequences.  Cooley (2009) has stated that the frequency 
and intensity of floods and droughts are expected to escalate at exponential rates, 
indicating that an event that might have occurred once every 100 years may occur once 
every 10 years.   
In addition to increasing water insecurity due to floods and droughts, climate 
change will likely affect both the supply of water resources available at local, national 
and regional levels, as well as increasing demand.  Jackson and his colleagues (2001) 
provide a rich discussion on the ways in which climate change will impact water 
availability.  First, the distribution of water over time and place will likely be a major 
outcome of climate change, which could potentially instigate other changes to the 
hydrologic cycle.  Seasonal rainfall may shift, as will run-offs from glaciers and ice-caps, 
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which feed most of the world‟s rivers.  While some areas will become wetter, other 
regions will become drier, which will induce greater rates of evaporation and will require 
more water resources for agricultural production (Jackson et al. 2001).  These researchers 
also highlight the impact that changing hydrologies will have on ecosystems which 
further effect human societies.  For example, they note that changes in local water 
habitats might result in the overproduction of certain algae or the loss of certain aquatic 
species, thereby creating imbalances in the larger environment or threatening food 
sources (Jackson et al. 2001).  The effects of climate change on the availability and 
productivity of water will also aggravate the challenges many water-short countries 
already face in regards to meeting their food production needs.  Therefore, while climate-
change primarily causes supply-induced scarcity, it simultaneously creates societal 
environments in which demand for water increases.   
Demand-induced scarcity results from increases in water withdrawals as a result 
of growing population and escalating consumption patterns.  Anxiety over water 
shortages focuses largely on the anticipated strains placed on finite water resources 
caused by rapid population growth (Gleick, 1993, 2009; Hunt, 2004; Postel, 2000; 
Watkins, 2006; WWDR-3, 2009).  Projections of global population growth imply 
exponential increases, estimating that we will reach over nine billion by the year 2050 
(Global Water Partnership, www.gwp.org; Postel; WWDR-3, 2009).  Postel(2000) notes 
that to meet the basic food needs of the global population in 2025, “an additional 500 
cubic kilometers of irrigation water” will be needed (2000: 942).  Homer-Dixon (1999) 
explains demand-induced scarcity that derives from rapid population growth also 
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stimulates supply induced scarcity, because as more water is being demanded for use, 
water is simultaneously being diminished in total amount or degraded by human and 
industrial pollutants.  
Population growth, therefore, impacts the „water resource pie‟ in two ways: it 
“forces the pie to be divided into smaller slices” and it reduces total size of the pie from 
overexploitation and misuse (Postel, 1996:35).  Estimates of the impact of population 
growth on the availability of water resources are dire.  Postel (2000) asserts that the 
number of people living in water-stressed countries will increase 600% by 2025.  Such 
concerns evoke Malthusian predictions that unfettered population growth would result in 
catastrophic resource shortages, placing undue strain on societies (Kahl, 2006).  Though 
traditional Malthusian theory has been discounted (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006), 
neo-Malthusians still provide valuable discussion points regarding the connection 
between population growth and water scarcity.  Kahl explains that neo-Malthusians 
recognize that the ill-effects of population growth are mediated by consumption habits 
and by technological innovation (2006:6).  While the potential for resource scarcity 
looms, multiple generations have demonstrated approaches to stave off catastrophe, such 
as the Green Revolution or various irrigation improvements.  The major contribution of 
the neo-Malthusians derives from their theories linking resource scarcity and conflict, 
which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
In addition to population growth, other demographic factors place strains on a 
country‟s water resources, particularly the rise in urban migration.  Some projections 
propose that the urban population will represent over 60% of global population in 2025 
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(Postel, 2000).  Rapid urbanization places significant strain on cities and states because it 
often occurs without sufficient planning (Kahl, 2006).  Urban migration increases the 
demands of urban dwellers, which often means that water designated for agricultural use 
is redistributed for cities (Postel, 2000).  While urbanization often infers economic 
growth, millions of people living in urban areas reside in urban slums, which have limited 
access to piped water and clean sanitation facilities (Watkins, 2006; WWDR-3, 2009).   
In addition, the rising middle-class in the world‟s cities signifies expanding 
consumption habits, such as a higher-protein diet, which place a greater demand on 
water.  Several countries, particularly China and India, possess the world‟s largest 
populations and greatest urban migration, and are also predicted to face severe water 
shortages in the coming decades (WWDR-3, 2009).  Current water shortages threaten 
China‟s food production capacity and their industrial development.  According to some 
estimates, the deep aquifer under the North China Plain has been declining at a rate of 10 
feet a year, and wells near Beijing burrow over a half a mile to access fresh water 
(Mitchell, 2007).  Other estimates imply that groundwater pumping in Beijing extracts 
thirty billion cubic meters of water a year (Barlow, 2007).  Although much of this water 
is designated for food production, Barlow notes that large amounts of water are diverted 
to “fuel China‟s economic „miracle‟” (2007: 14).  China and other countries are tackling 
their water constraints through food importation, also known as investing in “virtual 
water” (Barlow, 2007).  
Supply and demand induced water scarcity do not affect all individuals equally.  
Rather, structural disparities within societies often determine the extent to which 
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individuals experience water scarcity.  Structural disparities refer to imbalances within a 
society in terms of the distribution of political power and wealth that determine access to 
political goods.  The 2006 Human Development Report, titled Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
poverty and the global water crisis, establishes that water scarcity is primarily a 
manifestation of inequalities between the rich and the poor.  The report notes: 
“The problem is that some people – notably the poor – are systematically 
excluded from access [to water] by their poverty, by their limited legal 
rights or by public policies that limit access to the infrastructures that 
provide water for life and for livelihoods.  In short, scarcity is manufactured 
through political processes and institutions that disadvantage the poor.” 
(Human Development Report, 2006:3) 
This statement represents the essence of Homer-Dixon‟s structural scarcity, by which 
favored groups access disproportionately larger quantities of the resource, while 
disadvantaged groups receive insufficient quantities to support health and well-being 
(1999:15).  Drawing on Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of political economy, structural 
scarcity underscores the political, institutional and economic processes within societies 
that limit the accessibility of resources for segments of the population (Homer-Dixon, 
1999; Kahl, 2006).  Such processes may include restrictive property laws which exclude 
informal urban settlements from connecting to public utilities (Watkins, 2006:52), or 
parochial politics that allows certain groups greater access to water sources than others. 
While most structural scarcity occurs at the local/within-country level, it can also be 
present between states or state-like entities, for example the disparities in water access 
between Israel and Palestinian territories. 
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Because of the variety of causes and the negative consequences of water scarcity 
on human health and societies, scholars have formulated various approaches for 
measuring water scarcity and identifying the vulnerabilities for scarcity.  Some 
approaches focus on the amount of water available per capita, while others concentrate on 
water withdrawals relative to known supply, and still others also account for the presence 
and adaptability of water infrastructure and institutions.  Malin Falkenmark was among 
the first to propose a water scarcity index, in which a country‟s total available water 
resources were divided by the population.  Falkenmark and her group established the 
benchmark of 1700 cubic meters/capita/year of water as the level of water necessary for 
developed countries to maintain their standard of living and experience minimal water 
shortages (Gleick et al. 2002).  This benchmark level includes the amount of water 
individuals need for their daily requirements, as well as the amount of water represented 
in an individual‟s daily food intake, productive activity and other uses.  When water 
availability per capita drops below that benchmark, what Falkenmark termed as a “water 
barrier”, countries begin to experience negative outcomes on human and economic 
development (Gleick, 1993).  Falkenmark identified countries with less than 500 cubic 
meters/capita/year as experiencing absolute water scarcity (Gleick et al. 2002).   
Water scarcity is also often measured in terms of the amount of water withdrawn 
from renewable sources.  In many regions, humans already expropriate available water 
supply at a faster rate than natural recharge (Mitchell, 2007; Palaniappan & Gleick, 2009; 
Postel, 1996, 2000).  Some researchers assert that water shortages are experienced when 
countries withdraw at least 20% of their total water supply (Clarke 1993; Gleick 1993).  
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The Food and Agriculture Organization provides a more extreme estimate, explaining 
that physical water scarcity occurs when countries withdraw over 70% of their annual 
freshwater sources for domestic, agricultural and industrial purposes (FAO.org).  Both 
Peter Gleick (1990) and the International Water Management Institute (1997) have 
included water withdrawals in their respective indexes measuring vulnerabilities to water 
challenges.  In his Vulnerabilities to Water Systems Index, Gleick included two ratios 
that relate to water withdrawals: level of consumption compared to water availability, and 
level of groundwater overdraft compared to usual groundwater withdrawals (Gleick et al., 
2002).  The International Water Management Institute assessed both the anticipated 
increases in water withdrawals between 1990-2025, and the extent to which projected 
water withdrawals in 2025 nears its actual water limit (Gleick et al. 2002). 
Finally, there have been some indicators of water stress and water scarcity that 
also account for the adaptive capacity of the country, which includes the presence of 
water infrastructure and institutions.  Gleick‟s Vulnerabilities to Water Systems Index 
includes an indicator that focuses on the availability of storage facilities relative to annual 
water supply.  Gleick asserts that countries with limited storage capacity are more 
vulnerable to droughts or floods than countries with adequate storage facilities (Gleick et 
al., 2002).  Ohlsson et al. (1999) developed the Social Water Stress Index, which 
comprises the socio-economic environment of a given society along with general 
institutional capacity, and the existence of water legislation and water resource 
management (Gleick et al., 2002).  The Stockholm Environment Institute incorporates 
coping capacity in their Water Resources Vulnerability Index (Gleick et al., 2002), which 
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incorporates an assessment of the institutional capacity, political will, quality and 
availability of infrastructure, social imbalances in distribution of wealth and power, and 
availability and quality of the natural resource (Stockholm Environment Institute, sei-
international.org). 
 
Water Security and Interstate Conflict 
The concern with water scarcity extends beyond the limitations that water 
shortages will place on economic development and human well-being.  As the specter of 
water scarcities amplifies, scholars and policy makers have sounded the alarm regarding 
the potential for violent conflicts over water (Barlow, 2008; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 
2006; Klare, 2002; Kramer, 2004).  The concern is so great that past vice-president of the 
World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, and others have asserted that water will be the resource 
over which countries will fight in the next century (Barlow, 2008; Klare, 2002; 
Serageldin, 2009).  Significant research suggests that disputes over international waters 
have more often prompted cooperation between states than violent conflict (Wolf, 1994).  
However, the uncertain future cannot rely on trends of the past.  It is expected that 
intensifying water scarcity will heighten perceptions of insecurity for individuals and 
states, and increase competition for the resource, which could lead to conflict (Kramer, 
2004).  In addition, while states may be more inclined to find diplomatic solutions to 
sharing water resources, conflict at the local or intrastate level pose a threat to national 
and regional security, as these local conflicts could escalate in scale (Kramer, 2004; 
Postel, 2000; Wolf, 1994).  In discussing the link between water security and conflict, 
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this section will cover the factors that contribute to conflict and to cooperation between 
riparian states, international law regarding shared watercourses, and the types of violence 
that occurs at the subnational level because of water insecurity. 
At both the interstate level and the intrastate level, structures of power determine 
the evolution and outcomes of water-related conflicts.  Alex Evans (2010) asserts that 
how states or groups react to environmental scarcity is largely mediated by the political 
economy context of the country or region.  Describing work by Ruckstuhl (2009) on 
sustainable development in conflict sensitive areas, Evans provides four aspects of the 
structural context that influence access to resources.  These include ownership, 
consumption, distribution and governance (Evans, 2010), each of which incorporates 
issues of equity, control, and political voice.  At the international level, the structural 
context relates to the relative power position of riparian states, while at the subnational 
level, the structural context determines the explicit and implicit hierarchies established 
between groups that affects societal, political and economic marginalization.  In regards 
to access and control of natural renewable resources such as water, the structural 
imbalances of the subnational political economy can lead to what Homer-Dixon (1999) 
termed “ecological marginalization,” which occurs when economically and political 
disenfranchised groups are forced to move to environmentally precarious areas.  This 
idea of structural imbalances is important in the following discussion regarding water-
related conflicts at the interstate and intrastate levels. 
At the international level, water conflicts represent a category of hydropolitics, 
which entail the interactions and policy decisions of states regarding shared water 
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sources.  Considering that there are over 260 international river basins, the opportunity 
for contentious interstate relations over water is high (Barlow, 2008; Kramer, 2004).  
Though states traditionally claim all contents of their territory as part of their sovereign 
domain, the natural movement of water disregards territorial bounds (Dinar, 2002).  The 
mobile and solvable nature of water implies that the use of water sources in one state will 
likely affect the quality or quantity of the resource for other basin states.  In addition, for 
regions where the availability of water resources is limited, the attempt by one state to 
establish water security, such as developing a dam for water storage, may be perceived by 
other riparian states as threatening their water security.  
Significant research has been carried out to explore the extent to which water has 
been both a factor in violent conflict between states as well as a vehicle for negotiation 
and cooperation.  Peter Gleick and Aaron Wolf represent the most prominent, though 
often opposing, perspectives on the politics of water.  Gleick and his colleagues at the 
Pacific Institute have documented that while water has not been the declared objective of 
war between states in over 4000 years (Gleick, 1993; Wolf, 1999), water has been an 
implicit factor in disputes between riparian states that have occasionally resulted in 
military engagement between states (see Water and Conflict Chronology, 1998 onward).  
For example, access to or protection of water sources has been an underlying objective of 
conflict, such as in the territorial disputes between Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Syria 
(Dinar, 2002; Gleick, 1993; Klare, 2002), and in the ongoing tensions between Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq over Turkey‟s control of the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 
(Klare, 2002).  In addition, water has been employed either as a target of conflict or as an 
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instrument of war (Gleick, 1993).  Hydroelectric dams, irrigation water systems, and 
other water infrastructure were bombed in many of the recent wars, including World War 
II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the first Iraq war (Gleick, 1993).  Destruction 
of water infrastructure causes massive harm to a country, potentially inducing flooding, 
causing blackouts, and compromising the quality of the water for human consumption, 
thereby acting as an effective means for weakening opposing forces.  These examples 
confirm the assertion that water has been an integral feature in interstate conflict, even if 
states have not directly gone to war over water.   
Aaron Wolf and his colleagues have argued extensively that not all water-related 
conflict between states leads to violence.  Wolf asserts that water issues are more likely to 
promote cooperation between states than being a divisive factor that will lead to violent 
conflict (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009; Wolf, 1999).  Through their research at the Water 
Conflict Management and Transformation program at University of Oregon, Wolf and his 
colleagues have found that countries typically avoid potentially violent conflict over 
water and instead choose more diplomatic approaches, because “war over water seems 
neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor economically viable” (1999: 
29).  Instead, negotiation and the establishment of international treaties regarding shared 
water sources are the most common outcome of water disputes (see Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database).  Reviewing the outcomes of over 1700 interstate water-
related disputes over the past 150 years, the ratio of violent conflicts to agreements 
weighs heavily in favor of cooperation, at 507 to1228 (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).  
Contradicting the analysis that Gleick has provided regarding the use of water as a factor 
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in international conflict, Wolf argues that in the past 50 years, there are only 37 cases of 
acute military encounters involving water, and of these, 32 were between countries in the 
Middle East (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).  Wolf uses this evidence to support his 
assertion that conflict over water is strategically irrational and economically unviable.  
Instead, water basin states seem willing to engage in the lengthy process of negotiation to 
ensure recognition and protection of water use.   
Whether water acts as a contributing factor of conflict between states or whether 
it serves as a vehicle for cooperation depends on a number of environmental and political 
conditions.  First, water has to be perceived as having strategic value that adds to the 
economic and political power of the state, and therefore is worth defending or acquiring 
(Gleick, 1993; Klare, 2002).  Stated more urgently, water has to become an “issue of 
national survival” (Klare, 2002: 141).  Wolf proffers that the “national water ethos”, 
which includes the role of water in the historical national identity, the dominance of the 
agricultural sector in the economy, and the emphasis on water security in political 
rhetoric, will influence the extent to which water is viewed as national security issue 
(Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009:18).  Once water is determined to be a critical national 
asset, the degree of water scarcity experienced by the respective states represents a 
dominant condition contributing to the possibility of conflict (Dinar, 2002; Gleick, 1993; 
1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999), as it magnifies the value of the resource.  As discussed 
previously, the intensity of water scarcity is influenced by a number of factors, including 
the rate of water withdrawals relative to the rate of natural recharge and known absolute 
availability of water, the size of the demand given the actual supply, the quality of the 
39 
resource, and structural features that dictate how water is distributed across the 
population.  A condition related to the degree of scarcity is the adaptive capacity of basin 
states, both individually and on a regional level.  As noted by Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 
“the likelihood of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin exceeds the 
institutional capacity to absorb that change” (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009:19). 
Another condition that factors into the hydropolitics of a water basin is the extent 
to which a water source is shared by states (Dinar, 2002; Gleick, 1993; 1999).  When the 
number of claimants to a shared water source increases, it becomes more difficult to 
satisfy all stated concerns and needs, such as in the Nile River Basin, which involves ten 
riparian states.  The availability of alternative water sources will also be influential in the 
hydropolitics of a region (Dinar, 2002; Gleick, 1993; 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999).  When 
states are primarily dependent on a single water source, the appropriation of water by 
another user will likely be perceived as a threat to national water security.  In such cases, 
a state may be willing to endure the “economic, social and political cost” of conflict for 
the sake of protecting their access to water (Gleick, 1999: 108).  Relative level of 
development among the basin states also aggravates water relations, because water 
factors so highly in economic development, and because perceptions of relative 
deprivation exacerbate tension (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).  A history of animosities 
between basin states may also influence the occurrence of water-related conflict (Dinar, 
2002; Homer-Dixon, 1999) in that water disputes could provoke other areas of distrust 
and contention that incite violent conflict.   
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As with any interstate conflict, power relations between states sharing a water 
basin largely determines the hydropolitics of a region (Dinar, 2002; Gleick, 1993; 1999). 
As indicated by Ruckstuhl, relative power dynamics is influenced by the political 
economy of the region and determines how control over resources is established.  Most 
often, regional powers dominate the decisions regarding how water is allocated (Gleick, 
1999), and power imbalances in regards to water access can heighten the security 
dilemma between basin states (Dinar, 2002).  A critical factor in the relative power 
dynamics of basin states is states‟ physical position in relation to the water source.  While 
power politics alone can create complex interactions for neighboring states, riparian 
position complicates the strategic options even more.  Regardless of their relative power 
position, upstream states often have significant advantage over downstream states, 
because they can control the amount and timing of river flows.  Downstream states, as 
noted by Homer-Dixon, “often fear that their upstream neighbors will use water as a 
means of leverage” (Homer-Dixon, 1999:139).  Additionally, when the upstream riparian 
state is also the dominant power, the likelihood that the concerns of the downstream 
states will be recognized is low.  While the downstream riparian may wish to establish 
greater access or control over the water source, inciting conflict over water would only be 
strategically rational if the downstream state is also the regional power (Homer-Dixon, 
1999; Wolf, 1999), because it would require some position of advantage over the 
upstream state to attain objectives.  However, even in such a scenario, the judiciousness 
of initiating confrontation over water is unclear, because the destruction to upstream 
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dams or other attacks on water infrastructure upsets the flow and quality of the water 
source, creating negative downstream effects.      
The Nile River Basin provides an insightful example for how relative power and 
riparian position interact to determine the hydropolitics of a region.  Egypt has been the 
dominant power in the Middle East/North Africa region since the middle 1950‟s, 
possessing the largest army, and espousing to be the leader of the Arab world (Little, 
2008).  However, Egypt is also the downstream riparian state, and thus highly dependent 
on the actions taken by its upstream neighbors, Sudan and Ethiopia.  Egypt has used its 
power to dominate negotiations with Sudan regarding allocation and flows, such that 
Egypt can claim 55.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile‟s annual flow rate, while Sudan is 
allotted approximately 18.5 billion cubic meters (Klare, 2002).  While a treaty between 
Egypt and Sudan has been in place for the past 50 years, tensions between the Nile Basin 
countries persist because of perceived threats to water resources (Klare, 2002).  Egypt 
remains highly sensitive to the development projects proposed and initiated by upstream 
countries, viewing such actions as threats to their national security (Dinar, 2002).  This is 
particularly true for those countries with which Egypt has no formal water agreement, 
such as Ethiopia.  Similarly, the upstream states perceive Egypt‟s ability to dominate 
negotiations as impingements on their sovereignty and security (Dinar, 2002).  Tensions 
between the countries of this region are expected to grow as demand for food production 
and economic development increase (Barlow, 2008; Klare, 2002).  The hydropolitics of 
the Nile River Basin exemplifies the point that interactions between states in regards to 
water use and water access are influenced by numerous factors, including the relative 
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power of riparian states, the urgency of the water issue, the number of states claiming 
rights to the resource, and the level of dependency each state has on the shared water 
source.  Perception of an unfair distribution of a shrinking water pie is likely to be most 
influential in whether or not there is conflict between states. 
 
International Frameworks for Promoting Cooperative Water Sharing 
Wolf (1999) argues that institutional and legal frameworks at the regional and 
international levels represent a key resilience factor that contributes to cooperative 
outcomes in hydropolitics.  The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database details 
hundreds of water-related treaties, negotiation proceedings and cooperative agreements 
among riparian states over issues of timing, quantity and quality of water flows, and 
development projects.  Wolf and others assert that the existence of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements over shared water sources bolster the “hydropolitical resilience” 
of the region, as these agreements have withstood other controversies and incursions 
between parties (Dinar, 2002; Wolf, 1999). 
Water law, particularly at the international level, is still a developing area.  Many 
of the processes and agreements that have been put into place between riparian states 
have occurred in the absence of overarching international water laws and governance 
(Wolf, 1999).  While the international community has developed a handful of 
international declarations and guiding principles to instruct states on the equitable and 
sustainable use of international waters, the scope of international laws and institutions to 
oversee water relations between states is limited (Serageldin, 2009), leaving negotiation 
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over shared water resources largely up to the riparian states (Wolf, 1999).  Additionally, 
the capacity of the existing institutional framework to address increasingly complex 
problems has been questioned by some scholars (Gleick, 1993; Wolf, 1999).  Even at the 
regional level, the presence of functional and neutral water institutions is lacking, as only 
40% of the world‟s 263 international water basins possess some form of cooperative 
management agreement, most of which are between only two riparian states (Evans, 
2010).   In addition, present power dynamics between riparian states often dictates the 
terms and outcomes of the negotiation process (Evans, 2010), which likely heightens 
underlying tensions and uncertainty between states.  
The most notable international law regarding water use is the Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in May 1997.  This convention reaffirms and codifies the 
principles outlined in the Madrid Declaration (1991) and the Helsinki Rules (1966), 
which promoted equitable use and minimal harm, and adds to these processes for 
addressing disputes between users and the importance of transparency of information.  
While the Convention provides a foundation for strong international law regarding water 
use and conflict resolution, it has been weakened by the slow process of ratification 
(Wolf, 2002), and by its vague and sometime contradictory language (Wolf, 1999).  
Moreover, there is no intergovernmental organization adequately equipped to ensure 
adherence to the rules of engagement.  
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Intrastate Water Conflicts 
While interstate wars over water issues are rare, water has been a cause of 
violence at the subnational level (Evans, 2010; Gleick, 1993; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Wolf, 
1999), which refers to any form of violent interaction between individuals, groups and 
state actors within a recognized sovereign nation.  Disputes over inequitable distribution 
or access to water (Kramer, 2004), poor water quality (Kramer, 2004; Wolf, 1999), or 
forced displacement due to major water projects (Gleick, 2006) have all led to violent 
intergroup tensions as well as civil unrest against the state.  As with interstate conflict, 
water has been used as a weapon during civil wars, as well as a political tool, as in the 
case of political terrorism.  In addition, the consequences of water insecurity, for example 
the loss of livelihood or rising food prices, have also been identified as indirectly causing 
conflict at the local level (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kramer, 2004).   
Of the 114 water conflicts described in the Water Conflict Chronology as 
occurring between the end of WWII and 2006 (Gleick, 2006), nearly one third of these 
conflicts transpired at the subnational level.  In determining whether conflicts took place 
at the subnational level, I set criteria to include accounts of inter-group violence, civil 
unrest against the state, use of water as a weapon or target in civil war, and use of water 
as political tool as in the case of terrorism.  I determined “inter-group conflict” to refer to 
conflict between tribal, ethnic or religious groups, competing sectors of the economy, 
social classes, peoples from different provinces or federal states.  In identifying 
subnational conflicts involving water, I did not include cases in which water resources 
were impacted as part of war occurring within one country (such as the targeting of water 
45 
infrastructure in NATO‟s intervention in Yugoslavia, or damage done to facilities in US 
invasion of Iraq), or when external actors negatively impacted the quality or availability 
of a state‟s or entities water resources (such as the US‟s decision to halt water 
development projects in Gaza as punishment to Palestinian Authority‟s failure to respond 
to rising terrorism).  Interestingly, the frequency of intrastate violence involving water 
appears to increase after the end of the Cold War. 
In analyzing the causes of inter-group conflict or of civil unrest against the state, 
structural inequalities and relative deprivation represent two major underlying factors.  At 
the local level, determinations of ownership, consumption, distribution and governance 
(Evans, 2010) can be highly influential in provoking tensions between groups, as these 
structural inequalities often precipitate the experience of resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 
1999).  Relative deprivation refers to a subjective experience in which an individual or 
group perceives a disparity between their current state of quality of life and their desired 
state of quality of life (Homer-Dixon, 1999).  Homer-Dixon clarifies that relative 
deprivation involves “some subjective standard of equity and fairness, and … depends on 
the beliefs about economic justice held by individuals” (1999: 136).  In addition, 
assessments of the discrepancy between current well-being and desired well-being often 
include a comparison to some other individuals who are perceived to have more.  
Structural inequalities and relative deprivation can work concurrently or independently to 
create a sense of frustration among individuals or groups regarding their access to water. 
Disputes over the allocation or distribution of water resources among groups 
represent an important cause for violence at the intergroup level, as described by Gleick 
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in the Water Conflict Chronology.  Tensions between groups intensify when the 
availability of water resources declines, or when one group appears to be commandeering 
shared water resources.  For example, in January 2005, conflict erupted in Kenya when a 
group of land-owning farmers diverted river water to irrigate farmlands, at the expense of 
nomadic herdsmen (Gleick, 2006), while in in Afghanistan drought incited violent 
conflict between neighboring villages over the allocation and use of shared water 
resources (Gleick, 2006).  As with hydropolitics at the interstate level, riparian position 
influences perceptions of the equity of allocation and use of water resources among 
groups within a state.  For example, in India, the federal states of Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka have been engaged in a decades-long dispute regarding the allocation of the 
Cauvery River (Kramer, 2004).  Both states intend to appropriate the river flows for 
irrigation purposes, and view the other‟s intentions as interfering with their water rights.  
The contention between the two federal units has led to destruction of property, injury 
and a number of deaths (Gleick, 2006; Kramer, 2004). 
Degradation of water resources can also be a cause for intergroup conflict 
(Kramer, 2004), because it intensifies group identity, “we-them”, between those who 
degrade the water source and those who are affected by the degradation, and because it 
amplifies feelings of frustration and insecurity regarding the availability of clean water 
sources.  Degradation of water resources, along with other forms of environmental stress, 
has been identified as a factor in Tajikistan‟s civil war (Kramer, 2004), as well as inciting 
disputes between farmers and tanners in the Palar Basin of the Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu, where the industrial effluents from the tanning industry significantly compromise 
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the quality of the river water and threatened the health and well-being of residents 
(Kramer, 2004).  In 2001, fishermen in Zhejiang, China reacted to the destruction of their 
fisheries by damming a canal that carried industrial wastewater into their region, 
devastating the ecosystem of the neighboring province and threatening human health 
(Gleick, 2006). 
Degradation of water sources, perceptions of misallocation of water, and water 
shortages have also led to civil unrest against units of government, both national and 
provincial or statal.  In such situations, groups express discontent with the 
mismanagement of water resources by the state, whether it be lack of responsiveness, 
preferential distribution of water benefits, or privatization of the public good (Barlow, 
2008; Gleick, 2006; Kramer, 2004).  For example, water riots have occurred in India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China, where people protested against the inability of their 
government in addressing severe water shortages, and perceptions of unequal distribution 
of scarce resources based on group privilege (Gleick, 2006).  Similarly, citizens in 
Cochabamba Bolivia protested against the city‟s decision to privatize the water supply 
system, which imposed enormous price hikes on drinking water and essentially 
prohibiting the access to water among the city‟s poor (Barlow, 2008).  Civil unrest 
continued for several months and spread to other areas of the country before the 
government ordered soldiers to Cochabamba to quell the unrest (Barlow, 2008; Kramer, 
2004).   
Water infrastructure has been targeted by political opposition groups or other 
activist groups as a means of imposing political pressure on the state regarding the groups 
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demands.  Gleick identifies these acts of violence as terrorism, such as when the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) damaged gate valves in the major 
dam that supplies water to Bogota in 2002 (Gleick, 2006), or, in the same year, when the 
Khumbuwan Liberation Front in Nepal bombed a hydroelectric facility in Bhojpur 
District and targeted other micro-hydro projects throughout western Nepal (Gleick, 
2006).  Civil unrest against the government also occurs as a reaction to state development 
proposals that impose dislocation, appropriation and destruction of land and ecosystems.  
In such cases, the state‟s efforts to ensure water security undermine the security and well-
being at the human level.  In Guatemala, civilians protested in opposition to the 
construction of the Chixoy hydroelectric dam that would require their relocation from 
their ancestral home, and in Sudan, students and other resistant groups have demonstrated 
against the construction of the Jonglei Canal which diverts the natural flow of the White 
Nile to increase the flows into Egypt (Gleick, 2006).  However, in these cases, state 
actors often have the power advantage; in both examples, civilians were injured or killed 
by state actors.  Sandra Postel further explains that major water projects can exacerbate 
tensions between groups “if newly created access to scarce resources worsen existing 
inequalities, further marginalizes the poor, or creates opportunities for the rich to 
„capture‟ the resource” (Postel, 1996: 36).  The intensified intergroup tensions can cause 
groups to react against the state which is seen as reinforcing the structural inequalities.        
It has been well established that internal civil unrest, particularly when it becomes 
violent, threatens the stability and authority of the state (Rotberg, 2004).  Thus, scholars 
and particularly policy makers are alert to the potential for resource scarcity conflicts to 
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undermine the stability of nations and regions.  A recent USAID briefing paper 
acknowledges that limited access to water can provoke “incidents of interpersonal 
violence [that]… can become national and international concerns” (Kramer, 2004:1).  
The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recently disseminated a report that also 
recognizes the interconnections between water insecurity, intrastate conflict, and political 
and social stability (CFR, February 22, 2011).  The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies asserts that the perpetuation of poverty and underdevelopment because of water 
insecurity “has serious implications for broader US national interests – present and future 
– across the globe.” (Frist et al., 2009).  Apprehension regarding the consequences of 
water insecurity and conflict escalates for failing and fragile states.  Policy groups have 
begun to explore the intersections between water security, development, and state-society 
strength.  However, in the academic literature detailed analysis of how water insecurity 
impacts failing states is lacking.   
 
Summary  
The goal of this chapter was to establish the critical importance of water security 
for human and economic development, and to outline the links between water insecurity 
and conflict.  To do this, I discussed the pervasive role water plays as an essential input 
into all human life and nearly ever social and economic activity, as well as discussing the 
concept of the security-development nexus.  Water scarcity was discussed at length as a 
major type of water insecurity, and the cause for much of the concern over interstate 
water wars.  A review of water relations between states demonstrates that major military 
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conflict between states has not occurred as a direct result of water disputes.  However, 
water has been implicated in conflicts between states, either as a tool or a target of war.  
Moreover, securing water access has been an underlying trigger for interstate conflict.  
More importantly, water insecurity, more specifically water scarcity, has incited violence 
at the subnational level.  It is expected that as societal and environmental pressures 
increase in the coming years, as a result of population growth, economic development 
and climate change, water insecurity will also intensify for millions of people living 
within water stressed states.  Under such conditions, historical trends of cooperative 
water relations may not endure.  Moreover, as populations experience growing levels of 
human water insecurity, and subsequent consequences on their health, well-being, and 
livelihoods, public demand for the state to fulfill its obligation to promoting security and 
public welfare will intensify, and possibly overwhelm the state‟s capacity to respond.   
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CHAPTER 3   
STATE FAILURE: DEFINITION, CAUSES AND INDICATORS 
 
Over the past thirty years, concerns over the rise in civil wars, political upheavals, 
and state-sponsored terrorism have lead to significant research on understanding the 
phenomenon of state failure and determining its causal factors.  The concept of failed 
states emerged in the early 1990‟s, as the pattern of state disintegration following the end 
of the Cold War became strikingly apparent.  The violence and human suffering that 
accompanied the implosion of countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Cambodia and 
Yugoslavia shocked the international community and motivated discussion and debate 
regarding the responsibilities of the state and the international community when states fail 
to oblige their responsibilities.  The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 reinvigorated 
the world‟s attention to the problem of failed states and alerted the major powers that the 
consequences are not limited by territorial boundaries. 
Most definitions of state failure concentrate on defining failure in opposition to 
the ideal state, focusing particularly on the inability of the state to fulfill its most 
fundamental obligations – exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force and 
demonstrating the ability to control its territory (Brooks, 2005; Piazza, 2008; Rotberg, 
2002).  The modern concept of the state was affirmed with the Montevideo Convention 
(1933), which defined states of having a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
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government, and capacity to enter relations with other states (Rosenau, 1989).  In the 
current state-centric international system, states possess certain rights and obligations that 
confer the essence of stateness.  As sovereign entities, states enjoy constitutional 
independence from other states and hold the right against interference by external forces 
(J.Jackson, 2003; R. Jackson, 1987).  Likewise, states are obliged to control their borders, 
abide by international treaties and commitments, and strive to maintain peaceful relations 
with other states.  States are also expected to function for the benefit of their citizens, 
with the principal responsibility of providing a security guarantee (Rotberg, 2002).  In 
addition to security, states are expected to deliver other public goods that promote a 
functioning society, including infrastructure and a system for fiscal extraction and 
redistribution of resources and public welfare (Gros, 1996; Rotberg, 2004).   
Therefore, the concept of state failure applies to situations in which the political 
structures of a state, such as balance of power between branches of government, are in 
crisis (Langford, 1999), state institutions are weak or absent (Francois and Sud, 2006; 
Rotberg, 2002), a system of fair law and order is absent (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008), and 
societal cohesion disintegrates (Francois and Sud, 2006; Langford, 1999).  In such 
situations, the central government is unable to exert its authority throughout its territory; 
governance capacity is deficient; the economy is weak or in decline; and human 
insecurity is profuse due to high levels of interpersonal violence and low human 
development (Brooks, 2005; Helman and Ratner, 1992; Francois and Sud, 2006; Rotberg, 
2004).  In addition to the inability of the state to execute its authority, states that 
experience state collapse also suffer societal collapse, in which social cohesion dissolves 
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(Zartman, 1995: 6) and the state “no longer [acts as] as a source of identity and social 
meaning” (Langford, 1999: 64).  
In addition to generating tremendous detrimental consequences within the 
country, the failure of state institutions poses a significant threat to regional and 
international security to which the international community has not been adequately able 
to respond (Brooks, 2005; Carment, 2004; Ellis, 2005; Langford, 1999).  Failed states 
undermine the stability of neighboring states by permitting the rise of illicit arms trade 
and mass migration of refugees across borders, and are viewed as serving as training sites 
for international terrorist groups (Patrick, 2007; Piazza, 2008; Rotberg, 2002; 2004).  
Research has demonstrated that countries bordering countries experiencing civil unrest 
are more likely to experience negative economic effects, and the potential of civil 
violence (Collier, 2007; Francois & Sud, 2006; Rotberg, 2002).  Failed states threaten 
one of the most fundamental assumptions of many international theorists and 
practitioners that states offer the optimal form of political organization and stability 
(Helman and Ratner, 1992; Rotberg, 2002). 
For the purposes of this thesis, I define state failure as a phenomenon in which 
states, being the government institutions and offices and the political leaders directing 
those offices, are no longer capable or willing of ensuring the physical safety and public 
welfare of all peoples living within their territory.  State failure includes situations in 
which the mutually reinforcing bond between state and society has been severed, due to 
neglect or purposeful harm, and in which the state is afflicted with weakened authority 
and legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the society. 
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Not all of these ills have to be manifest in order for states to be considered failed, 
though the dissolution of the governing capacity and authority are necessary features to 
precipitate failure.  Because of the variability of symptoms, both in terms of prevalence 
and intensity, the concept of state failure encompasses a spectrum of severity.  Weak and 
fragile states mark one end of this spectrum, comprising of states that demonstrate a 
handful of problematic features placing them at risk of failure, but which maintain some 
level of functional authority and legitimacy.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
collapsed states, such as Somalia, which have no functioning government and exhibit 
extreme lawlessness (Zartman, 1995); such “states” are barely states as commonly 
conceived, as even the territorial boundaries which once defined them are contested 
(Brooks, 2005).  While this spectrum provides some utility in identifying the extent to 
states are experiencing symptoms of failure, several scholars have argued that state 
fragility and state failure is not an inevitable unidirectional trajectory or even a 
guaranteed path (Carment, 2003; Gros, 1996).  It should not be assumed that if a state 
shows signs of weakness, this state is doomed to fail.  States can remain in a condition of 
weakness for decades, without ever experiencing true state failure.  Therefore, the term 
state failure has been applied to an array of states that exhibit symptoms of state failure, 
even if they demonstrate some ability to function.   
This thesis contends that water insecurity creates unmanageable situations for 
failing states because it undermines many of the critical areas that support positive state-
society functioning.  State failure occurs when various political, societal and economic 
stressors overwhelm the capacity of the state.  Water insecurity contributes to these 
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challenges by revealing deep-rooted weakness and precipitating immediate contingent 
pressures.  While academics and policy makers recognize that failed states will 
experience the most challenge in responding to water stress and the changes induced by 
climate change, minimal work has been done to explore the implications of water 
insecurity on failing states, particularly in understanding the increased pressures placed 
on state institutions to respond to water stress.  Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) and Colin 
Kahl (2006) have each proposed arguments regarding the causal pathways that lead from 
environmental scarcity and stress to violent interpersonal conflict and civil unrest.  In this 
chapter, I will discuss the key indicators and causes of state failure, and discuss the 
proposals of Homer-Dixon and Kahl as they relate specifically to the connections 
between water insecurity and state failure.  I will extend their analyses to explicate the 
ways in which water security relates to foundational aspects of state-society strength, and 
demonstrate that the absence of water security undermines a country‟s economic 
potential, human security and human development, and reveals a weakened state 
capacity.   
   
Political, Economic, and Societal Indicators of Failure 
 Due to the grave concern centered on the causes and consequences of state failure, 
significant research has been carried out to determine the political, economic, and societal 
indicators of failure that may alert the international community to the potential threat of 
state collapse.  This work started in the early 1990‟s with contributions from Helman and 
Ratner (1992), I. William Zartman (1995), and Jean-Germain Gros (1996), who were 
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responding to the atrocities occurring in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
Since this early work, numerous other indices have been developed to help explain the 
increasingly frequent phenomenon.  Among these indices, the Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy (CIFP), the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), and the Fund for Peace 
CAST system provide the most extensive methodologies and sets of indicators for 
identifying and determining cases of state failure.   
Carlton University‟s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index 
categorizes state-robustness/fragility indicators along six dimensions, covering 
governance, economics, human development, demography, security, and environment.  
Their analyses also include assessments of a country‟s authority, legitimacy and capacity, 
as well as monitoring of major political, economic or societal events occurring within the 
country (CIFP, Methodology, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/).  This approach recognizes 
that state weakness and state failure are dynamic processes that have different causes and 
manifestations in different countries.  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy proffers that 
by employing this multidimensional approach they are better able to determine effective 
policy strategies for intervention and prevention. 
Since the mid 1990‟s, the Political Instability Task Force has employed a system 
that enables them to compare hundreds of case studies of civil conflict, political 
instability and state failure to over a thousand political, demographic, economic, social 
and environmental variables to establish a set of indicators that would statistically explain 
state failure with a high level of certainty (Political Instability Task Force).  Consistently, 
over five years of analyses, four factors have been identified as primary determinants of 
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political instability and state failure: regime type, low levels of material well-being (e.g. 
high infant mortality rates), low trade openness, and presence of major civil conflict on 
two or more bordering countries (Political Instability Task Force, Phase IV Report).  
These factors are easily measured by outside observers, as agencies and organizations 
have been tracking human development and economic activity globally for decades.   
The Fund for Peace developed a similar assessment tool for identifying potential 
situations of conflict.  This system, Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), 
incorporates both quantitative and qualitative indicators that are entered into a rating 
system that allows for trend analysis. The assessment tool also takes into account the 
capacity of core state institutions and any unanticipated factors that can contribute to the 
risk of conflict. According to the Fund for Peace, CAST is “widely sought after as a 
structured tool that can identify and anticipate failing states” (Fund for Peace website).  
The indicators that the CAST system monitors include demographic stress, group 
grievances, uneven development, declining authority of the state, poor human rights 
record, and increased security apparatus (see Fund for Peace website).  Using the CAST 
system, Fund for Peace collaborates with Foreign Policy to publish the annual Fragile 
State Index.  Below, I will discuss the major political, economic, and societal indicators 
that have been identified by these and other indices. 
 
Political Indicators of Failure 
Throughout the literature on state failure, academics and policy makers highlight 
that state failure occurs when core elements of a state‟s sovereignty – authority, 
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legitimacy, or capacity – devolve.  This trinity comprises the central component of the 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy fragility index.  Researchers at Country Indicators 
for Foreign Policy assert that dysfunction or weakness in any of these critical features of 
stateness places a given state at risk of failure (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2007).  Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy defines authority as the ability of the state to project power 
and governance over its entire territory and to fulfill its responsibilities as a sovereign 
entity, particularly a security guarantee to its citizens (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2007).  
In the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty, authority also implies independence 
from other entities in the implementation of domestic and foreign policy (Jackson, 2003).  
The second pillar of stateness is legitimacy, which represents the level of affiliation and 
support the public gives to the state and the policies it chooses to implement (Carment, 
Prest and Samy, 2007).  Homer-Dixon defines legitimacy as “the strength of the state‟s 
moral authority; i.e. the extent to which the populace obeys its commands out of a sense 
of allegiance and duty, rather than as a result of coercion or economic incentive” (Homer-
Dixon, 1999: 100).  The concept of legitimacy also refers to the recognition bestowed on 
a state by other sovereign states (Jackson, 2003).  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 
defines capacity as the ability and willingness of a state to “mobilize public resources for 
productive uses” (Carment, Prest and Samy, 2007:15).  Capacity represents a critical area 
of state functioning, because it encompasses fiscal and human capital, political will, and 
efficient institutions, which allow the state to operate proficiently.   
In failed and failing states, some aspect of the state‟s authority, legitimacy or 
capacity has been weakened.  Failed states are typically described as those states which 
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have lost control over their territory (e.g. authority) (Brooks, 2005; Jackson, 1987; 
Rotberg, 2002; 2004; Zartman, 1995), that are unable or unwilling to meet their 
obligations to their citizens (e.g. capacity) (Brooks, 2005; Francois and Sud, 2006; 
Rotberg, 2002; 2004), and that no longer receive the support and allegiance of the various 
people groups within their borders because these groups feel neglected by the state (e.g. 
legitimacy) (Dorff, 2005; Francois and Sud, 2006; Kaplan, 2009; Langford, 1996).  
Tonya Langford (1999) emphasizes that state failure is a reflection of a state‟s declining 
capacity and its “right to rule” (1999: 64).  Moreover, weakness in one area diminishes 
the strength of the other areas.  As Homer-Dixon explains, "a widening gap between 
rising demands on the state and the state's actual performance … erodes state 
legitimacy…. As the state weakens, the social balance of power can shift in favor of 
groups challenging state authority" (1999:103).  Dissolution of a state‟s authority, 
legitimacy or capacity engenders negative repercussions for multiple dimensions of state 
functioning and societal well-being, including political and economic malfeasance, 
human insecurity, and intergroup conflict.   
In addition to demonstrating weakness in the core characteristics of state 
functioning, failing and failed states exhibit a number of various political maladies.  A 
comparison of the indicators outlined by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, the 
Political Instability Task Force and the Fund for Peace reveals agreement on many of the 
possible dimensions by which to assess a state‟s level of stability or fragility.  In 
determining political indicators for assessing instability or potential internal conflict, the 
Political Instability Task Force, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy and the Fund 
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for Peace emphasize government type as a critical variable.  The Political Instability Task 
Force identifies regime type as their key variable in determining whether a state is at risk 
of a political crisis, while the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy focuses on „Level of 
Democracy‟.  The Fund for Peace does not have an explicit category for governance type 
in the list of political indicators, however they do list “emergence of authoritarian, 
dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and 
processes are suspended or manipulated” as a sub-indicator under Suspension or 
Arbitrary Application of Rule of Law (Fund for Peace).  In addition, the Fund for Peace 
identifies strong political leadership with governance capacity as one of the core 
institutions needed for stable states. 
The Political Instability Task Force operationally defines regime type as the 
“patterns of political authority evident not only in formal state institutions but also in the 
organization and behavior of key political actors” (Bates et al., 2003: 33).  According to 
the Political Instability Task Force, regime type refers to whether a state is considered a 
democracy or an autocracy, and within that dichotomy, whether the state is strong or 
weak.  Over the course of a decade of research, the Political Instability Task Force has 
determined that partial or limited democracies and autocracies with political competition 
are the most at risk of political instability, while full democracies and closed autocracies 
are less likely to experience political instability.  Countries that are considered full 
democracies are characterized as having established procedures for ensuring open and 
competitive political participation, competitive elections, and strong constraints on the 
powers of the chief executive.  Optimally, such characteristics of a state‟s political 
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structure promote the state‟s legitimacy, and embrace representation of all segments of 
society.  In contrast, political stability is maintained in full autocracies through 
suppression/oppression.  In full autocracies, the chief executive comes to power through 
force or patronage, and benefits from the absence of constraints on his power and 
authority. While the full autocracy may not possess the legitimacy of a full democracy, 
stability is maintained through strict control over all affairs of the state. 
Partial democracies and autocracies with political competition experience a 
greater risk of instability than strong full democracies or closed autocracies because they 
have inconsistent patterns of political authority (Bates et al., 2003).  For partial 
democracies, political stability is compromised because of factional political competition 
or minimal constraints on the executive‟s power, or in some cases both.  Weak partial 
democracies are almost 30 times more likely to experience a political crisis than full 
democracies or closed autocracies (Bates et al., 2003).  Autocracies that cannot suppress 
political competition are less at risk than the weak democracies, however, these regimes 
also face the possibility of political upheaval because there is no real opportunity for 
political participation, open discourse, or venue to address the issues raised by the 
opposition (Bates et al., 2003).   
Like the Political Instability Task Force, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 
uses the Polity IV dataset for their analysis of level of democracy.  This dataset ranks 
countries across a two dimensional continuum, with autocracies on the negative end (with 
scores ranging from -10 to -6) and democracies on the positive end (with scores ranging 
from 6 to 10) (Polity IV Project, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).  
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Carment, Prest and Samy (2007) explain that their multidimensional model for assessing 
fragility presents a u-shaped relationship between level of democracy and level of 
fragility.  This u-shaped relationship would suggest that countries with neither strong 
autocratic governments, nor strong democratic governments are more likely to have 
higher/positive scores on the fragility index (Carment, Prest, and Samy, 2007).     
Instead of concentrating on governance type per se, the Fund for Peace include 
indicators that point to systemic problems in a country‟s political culture and the 
relationship between state and society.  In their CAST framework, corruption and 
criminalization of state entities underscore critical weaknesses in the state‟s authority and 
legitimacy.  Such weaknesses can be assessed by the level of transparency and 
accountability within government, the extent to which elections are open or contested, 
and the rise of insurgencies (Fund for Peace).  In addition, the militarization of the state, 
politicized ethnic factionalism, and decline of rule of law (Fund for Peace) also draw 
attention to the inability or unwillingness of state institutions to govern for the entirety of 
the populace.   
 
Economic Indicators of Failure 
The demise of state institutions also manifests in the economic sphere.  As in 
other areas, as states begin to show signs of failure, the capacity of state institutions to 
make good economic policy or to manage its fiscal responsibilities falter, such as fiscal 
extraction and redistribution of wealth (Caporaso, 1989; Rotberg, 2004; Van de Walle, 
2004).  In some cases, the ruling elite siphon monies for their personal accounts rather 
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than allocating it for public services; Mobutu Sese Seko exemplified such kleptocratic 
tendencies (Rotberg, 2004).  In other cases, opposition groups attempt to seize control of 
the state and the state coffers, leading to drawn-out and economically damaging civil 
wars (Van de Walle, 2004).  Other failing states lack the governing capacity to fulfill its 
fiscal responsibilities, and so are characterized by economic stagnation (Van de Walle, 
2004).  When states show signs of failure, national and international investment 
diminishes, and with it, job growth and the availability for basic goods and services 
(Rotberg, 2004).  Such impacts on the economy of these states persist for years (Collier, 
2007).  Collier underscores that economic stagnation heightens the risk that the failed 
state will revert to civil conflict within the first ten-years of any attempt to rebuild (2007: 
27).   
There are a number of economic variables that have been identified as potential 
indicators of state failure.  According to Carment, Prest and Samy (2007), the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy has determined the most significant economic predictor of 
stability/instability to be level of development, which they define as per capita GDP.  In 
addition, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy looks at a number of economic variables, 
including the size of the economy, external debt as percent of GNI, the size of the 
informal market, unemployment rates, and trade openness (Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy website).  The Political Instability Task Force also identified level of trade 
openness as one of their major predictive factors.  Trade openness is defined as the ratio 
of a country‟s exports and imports to the country‟s GDP (Bates et al., 2003).  Trade 
openness denotes the extent to which a country is integrated into the regional and global 
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economy.  In addition, trade openness provides an indication of the robustness of the 
country‟s economic health and the country‟s attractiveness to foreign investors.  
According to Political Instability Task Force‟s research, countries with low levels of 
trade openness are 50 times more likely to experience political crises than countries with 
more open trade policies.   
In an effort to explain the relationship between trade openness and political 
stability, the Task Force proffers multiple interpretations.  One interpretation focuses on 
the positive implication that trade openness directly and indirectly underpins political 
stabilization because it promotes economic growth and democratic processes.  Another 
interpretation implies that the low level of trade openness is linked to inefficiencies in the 
political leadership, either due to corruption or patronage, or to poor business 
environments in which there are limited regulations in place to protect property and 
enforce contracts (Goldstone et al., 2000).  This interpretation suggests that the 
correlation between trade openness and political instability may be connected by a third 
factor, such as weak governance capacity.   
Another approach to identifying the economic indicators of state failure is to 
examine structural and contingent factors of a given state.  Nicholas Van de Walle (2004) 
asserts that while structural factors predispose some states to political and economic 
weakness, contingent factors precipitate a state‟s demise.  Van de Walle (2004) defines 
structural factors as those economic and sociological characteristics that are fixed in the 
short-to-medium term, such as the structure of the economy, level of population density, 
and governmental capacity.  He explains that countries with low population density, 
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heavy reliance on agriculture, and weak governmental capacity face enormous challenges 
in fulfilling expected fiscal obligations of managing a system of taxation and 
redistribution (2004).  Van de Walle overlooks several important structural factors, 
including level of infrastructure to promote business development, geographical 
endowments both in terms of physical location and availability of natural resources, and 
level of education.   
For Van de Walle (2004), structural factors predispose states toward weakness, 
however, contingent factors cause states to fail.  He defines contingent factors as short-
term events that result from bad economic policy making or from the influence of donors 
(2004).  Poor economic policy making, such as inability to extract tax revenues or 
establish a viable budget, reflects weaknesses in governance capacity and lack of political 
will.  As a result, foreign investors may withdraw their support, the state has a tighter 
spending capacity, and it incurs more debt.  Additionally, states with higher reliance on 
international donors are more at risk of experiencing economic weakness because they 
have more debt and are obliged to the policy specifications outlined by the donors (Van 
de Walle, 2004).  Moreover, heavy reliance on aid has the potential of undermining the 
state‟s ability to establish independent economic strength. 
Van de Walle gives only cursory attention to other potential contingencies that 
can have huge impact on the economic viability of a state, such as instability in 
neighboring countries, civil violence, or environmental disasters.  This negligence is 
faulty because it diminishes the importance of such internal and external factors in 
weakening a state‟s capacity, legitimacy and authority.  The Fund for Peace recognizes 
66 
that such contingencies have critical implications for the stability of states, and have 
incorporated a process for identifying, assessing and monitoring any unanticipated events 
that provoke instability and conflict.  This process, called STINGS
2
, stands for surprises 
(e.g. currency collapse), internal or external triggers (e.g. assassinations or coup d‟état), 
unique idiosyncrasies (e.g. non-contiguous territory, deference to authority), national 
temperaments (e.g. cultural or religious ideations), and spoilers (e.g. excluded or 
dissatisfied groups).  This aspect of the CAST assessment recognizes that while internal 
conflict and state failure may have common manifestations across countries, the 
circumstances that cause any given state to fail are unique.  
 
Societal Indicators of Failure 
States that suffer from weak political systems and poor economic capacity also 
tend to exhibit societal issues that further challenge the state‟s capacity and weaken its 
authority and can potentially instigate instability.  Societal factors, such as a skewed 
demographic distribution, high levels of urbanization, the presence of refugees and 
internally displaced people, intergroup tensions, and low human development, can act as 
stressors that overwhelm a state‟s capacity to govern and can undermine state authority 
and legitimacy.  Many academics categorize low levels of societal well-being as a 
consequence of state fragility, implying that the incapacitation of the state institutions 
results in dropping life expectancies, increasing rates of infant and maternal mortality, 
rapid spread of disease, and economic stagnation (Rotberg, 2004; Snodgrass, 2004; 
                                                 
2
 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107&Itemid=145#4 
67 
Zoellick, 2008).  However, low levels of human development also can be a cause of 
instability as human security becomes more precarious.  
The three major indices of state failure each include some set of demographic and 
societal indicators, which they employ as signals of possible failure.  Under the domain 
of demographic indicators, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy includes life 
expectancy, population density, urbanization rate, estimated rates of migration, and 
population diversity in regards to ethnicity and religion.  Similarly, the Fund for Peace 
emphasizes demographic pressures that arise from increased demands on limited 
resources particularly between divergent groups, as a critical risk factor for state failure.  
As examples, the Fund for Peace lists high population density and internal displacement 
of peoples.  The Political Instability Task Force focuses primarily on indicators of 
societal well being, such as infant mortality rate.  Serving as proxies for other indicators 
of societal and material well-being, these types of indices reveal a negative feedback loop 
in which gaps in the state‟s ability to ensure the security and well-being of the population 
creates greater demands on the state which extend beyond its ability to cope. 
Demographic pressures pose a considerable challenge to many countries, 
particularly to underdeveloped countries.  Population density, population growth, 
urbanization, and imbalances in demographic groups intensify the demands placed on 
state institutions for public health, job creation, and public welfare.  Among the 
demographic indicators identified by the three indices as potential factors that contribute 
to instability, youth bulge (e.g. the percent of population that is under the age of 25) is the 
only one mentioned by all three.  This consistency reflects current assumptions that 
68 
countries with more young people are often considered more volatile, particularly when 
countries have few opportunities for employment, political voice and improved quality of 
life (Staveteig, 2005).  Staveteig (2005) explains that it is not the ratio of young people to 
adults that is the key contributor to instability per se, but rather the growing level of 
frustration and alienation experienced by these youth because resources and opportunities 
do not exist in equal number.  She concurs with others in the field that disenfranchised 
youth are more likely to involve themselves with opposition movements or religious 
extremist groups that take violent measures against the state.  Therefore, excess youth, 
when matched with limited opportunity, can be viewed as a hot point for states at risk of 
failure. 
High levels of groupness signify another societal factor that can add stress on a 
state‟s authority, legitimacy or capacity, as demonstrated by many of the current failing 
or failed states, including Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Sudan.  Groupness refers to the 
extent to which individuals identify with a specific ethnic, linguistic, religious, socio-
economic or other group rather than with national identity.  Heterogeneity on its own is 
not bad for a state.  However, challenges arise when structures within society appear to 
benefit one group over other groups (Homer-Dixon, 1999), or when groups seek to revise 
the national borders of the state along group lines, either through secession or irredentism 
(Miller, 2010; Rotberg, 2002b).  Benjamin Miller explains that revisionist aspirations 
relate to state-nation incongruence, which he explains as occurring when the current 
political boundaries of a state do not reflect the national affiliation of the peoples living 
within the regions of said state (2010: 75-76).  He further qualifies the concept of state-
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nation incongruence by noting that some politically defined states are comprised of 
numerous national or ethno-linguistic groups leading to internal incongruence, while 
other states experience external incongruence because they share a single ethno-linguistic 
group with a neighboring state (Miller, 2010).  State-nation incongruence challenges the 
state‟s authority and legitimacy because the populace relies on other entities to provide 
basic services.  Moreover, it signifies that the state institutions have not been capable of 
coalescing a broader national identity that relates to the political entity of the state.  
Homer-Dixon notes that social psychological theories of group behavior use 
group identity to explain intergroup conflicts, as groupness creates “„we-they‟ cleavages” 
(1999:136).  Group identity allows groups to place blame on other groups for the 
frustration or deprivation experienced.  Rotberg affirms this notion, explaining that “the 
civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity” (2002b:86).  States in which inter-
group tensions are high tend to be characterized by parochial politics on the part of the 
ruling elite, and perceptions of oppression and negligence on the part of the marginalized 
groups.  Such states exemplify Gros‟ „captured‟ state (Gros, 1996) in which elites from a 
specific communal group seek to use their control of the state for their own benefit.  In 
such states, overt or implicit ethnic discrimination becomes the norm, and the state can be 
accused of overlooking its sovereign responsibilities to provide security and basic welfare 
for all the various people groups within its boundaries.  Further, parochial politics 
characterize the less stable regime types which serve as the Political Instability Task 
Force‟s primary predictor of political instability.  Both weak partial democracies and 
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autocracies with some political competition often experience factionalized politics, 
usually along communal group lines. 
Human development indicators also reflect the status of a state‟s strength or 
fragility, as human development is often a direct manifestation of political priorities and 
state capacity to act upon those priorities.  Most often, failed states are among the poorest 
countries in the world, with also the lowest ranking of human development (CIFP, 
Human Development Reports).  Variables of human development that have been taken 
into account by Country Indicators for Foreign Policy and Political Instability Task Force 
include literacy rates, education enrollment rates, mortality rates, rates of HIV infection, 
and access to clean water sources and sanitation.   In their analyses, the Political 
Instability Task Force found infant mortality rates to be one of four major predictors of 
political instability, along with regime type.  The Political Instability Task Force explains 
that infant mortality rates are highly correlated with risk of political instability because 
they are more sensitive to the reality of societal well-being than per capita income (Bates 
et al., 2003).  Infant mortality serves as a robust proxy for overall health and well-being 
of society because it reflects the quality of and access to medical facilities, shelter, and 
clean drinking water.  The Political Instability Task Force also expresses a suspicion “that 
infant mortality is sensitive to economic distortions caused by poor governance and 
official corruption” (Bates et al., 2003:46).  The Political InstabilityTask Force 
researchers emphasize, however, that their analyses do not identify low levels of material 
well-being as a major cause of political instability, even though infant mortality rates are 
significantly correlated with political instability.  Instead, high rates of infant mortality 
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can be a symptom of other issues, such as poor economic policy making or low levels of 
economic development, which are more likely to be linked to political instability than 
material well-being overall. 
 
State Failure and Violence 
The combined political, societal and economic pressures that are typically found 
in failed and failing states often manifests in violence, though Carment, Prest and Samy 
(2007) emphasize that not all failed states exhibit interpersonal violence or violent civil 
unrest.  Like other societal factors, interpersonal violence is seen as both a consequence 
and risk factor of state failure.  Kasfir (2004) explains that when the state‟s authority 
disintegrates, the process creates a situation of domestic anarchy that leads individuals 
within that state to react to the threat of violence either in self-defense or violent 
predation.  Self-protective behavior can initiate cycles of interpersonal violence, as it 
heightens the sense of insecurity and further impairs societal trust (Kasfir, 2004).  Violent 
predation occurs when individuals or groups use whatever means possible to obtain the 
possessions of other individuals or groups for their self-benefit (Kasfir, 2004: 65).  Such 
means could include banditry, looting, and robbery, or more formal criminal means of 
manipulation, such as gang or mob syndicates (Rotberg, 2002).  Francois and Sud (2006) 
emphasize that the disintegration of central authority and the state‟s monopoly on 
legitimate use of force induces “violent contestation over who will control the state” and 
the various benefits and power that comprise sovereignty (144), including natural 
resource rents and international aid.  The inability of the state to impose rule of law and 
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provide security for its people can result in a state of anarchy which may lead to violent 
outbreaks.  
There are also instances when the state itself may be the perpetrator of violence, 
such as state-led discrimination or repression against communal groups.  The Political 
Instability Task Force focuses on these types of violence as indicators of state failure, as 
they reflect a level of political malaise and social disharmony that threatens the cohesion 
of the state overall, regardless of the outcome of ethnic war (Bates et al., 2003).  State-led 
violence provides a clear indication that the state is unwilling to protect and promote the 
well-being of the whole populace.  The Rwanda of the 1990‟s exemplifies this type of 
failure.  While the state demonstrated strong control of many of the core institutions of 
the state, the political elite used their control of power to carry out genocide.   
The danger of ethnic conflict and parochialism to the stability of a state is not 
limited to internal politics. States that share borders with two or more countries in the 
midst of an ethnic or major armed civil conflict are also considered to be at greater risk of 
experiencing political instability themselves than those states which reside in a good 
neighborhood (Collier, 2007; Bates et al., 2003).  In addition, because borders were often 
arbitrarily demarcated by colonial powers, ethnic groups often straddle the literal 
territorial boundaries of two states (Miller, 2010; Bates et al., 2003), and thus may have a 
vested interest in the conflict occurring across the border.   In discussing the various 
causes of persistent poverty, economist Paul Collier (2007) also asserts that bad 
neighbors are detrimental to the economic and socio-political stability of a state.  When a 
state is bordered by another state in conflict, the former is likely to experience numerous 
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ramifications, both political and economic.  Major civil or ethnic conflict often results in 
a mass influx of refugees seeking asylum, which places great social welfare demands on 
the host state (Collier, 2007; Rotberg, 2004).  Guerrilla and state-backed soldiers, along 
with dangerous arms, may cross borders in pursuit of opponents, which significantly 
heightens the insecurity of civilians living along those borders (Collier, 2007).  Finally, 
violent conflict incurs huge economic costs for both the host state and its neighboring 
states, depressing growth rates by at least 2% a year (Collier, 2007).  
Failed and failing states exhibit a number of problematic features that create 
national, regional and potentially global insecurity.  In addition, failed and failing states 
significantly impede the human development potential of people living within their 
contested borders, and heighten experiences of human insecurity.  Stifled human 
development and intensified feelings of insecurity deepen the crisis within the state.  To 
date, the international community has been uncertain about how to address the challenges 
presented by failed and failing states, primarily because intervention is expensive and 
because intervention violates conceptions of sovereignty.  Moreover, the validity of the 
concept itself has been questioned as being ethnocentric, neo-imperialistic, and pejorative 
(Herbst, 2004; Jackson, 1987; Richardson, 1996).  However, the concept of “failed state” 
provides a necessary mechanism for discussing the problematic outcomes of state 
disintegration and intensive civil conflict.  Whether we call it state failure or not, we 
cannot deny that some states do actually fail, and this process creates extreme threats to 
the physical safety and overall well-being of the persons living within that territory.  
Therefore “failed state” allows the international community to identify and group states 
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that present symptoms of failure and to work with those states to attempt to prevent 
complete failure and safeguard the state‟s populations. 
 
A Proposed Analysis Explicating the Ways by which Water Security Supports State 
Strength 
While the literature on state failure comprises numerous political, societal and 
economic factors that both precipitate failure and alert the international community of 
potential problems, little consideration has been given to environmental factors as 
potential risk factors for state failure.  Even less attention has been given to the issue of 
water insecurity, despite the evidence that water stress creates enormous political, 
economic and societal challenges for states.  While some environmental concerns are 
noted, such as the expected negative impacts induced by climate change, water insecurity 
and other forms of environmental challenges are often treated as contingent events that 
compound upon an already precarious situation.  For some scholars, such as Collier 
(2007), natural resources are considered in the set of causal factors, but generally they 
include only non-renewable resources, such as oil or precious minerals, which attain 
higher value than renewable resources such as water, and are therefore more contested.   
I propose that water insecurity represents deep-rooted issues that present 
significant risk factors for failing and failed states.  Water insecurity implies low state 
capacity, particularly in regards to short and long term planning, insufficient institutions, 
and inadequate infrastructure.  A deficit in water infrastructure and institutional capacity 
is likely to be symptomatic of broader incapacitation across other domains.  The inability 
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to secure water resources hinders economic growth and human productivity.  Water 
insecurity places additional stress on intergroup relations, intensifying feelings of 
inequalities between groups, which can test the state‟s monopoly of legitimate use of 
force and increase demands for state allocated social welfare.  Water insecurity therefore 
undermines economic security for the state, as well as livelihoods, food security, and 
human health and well-being, all of which create a negative feedback loop that can 
undermine the capacity and legitimacy of the state.   
To explore the interplay between water insecurity and state failure, I will first 
review the arguments of two political scientists who provide useful frameworks for 
understanding the interrelationship between water security and state-society 
stability/water insecurity and state failure.  Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) and Colin Kahl 
(2006) have each attempted to identify causal pathways from environmental scarcity to 
violent conflict (Homer-Dixon) and state failure (Kahl).  The basis of their arguments is 
similar; both argue that environmental stress increases the amount of demand and 
pressure placed on states and that the reaction in weak states is often violence.  Both 
Homer-Dixon and Kahl utilize neo-Malthusian theories, though Homer-Dixon places 
primary emphasis on the structural inequalities and political-social economy of states as 
inducing environmental stress.  Structural inequalities denote the explicit and implicit 
imbalances within a society in regards to who controls political power and wealth, and 
how access to political goods is determined.   
The essence of Homer-Dixon‟s argument is that environmental scarcity “acts as a 
deep underlying stressor of social systems [that] produces effects by interacting with 
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contextual factors unique to society” (1999:81).  Homer-Dixon (1999) warns against the 
tendency among analysts who assume that environmental scarcity act only as an 
aggravator that triggers preexisting problems within the socio-political domain.  Instead, 
he notes that environmental scarcity undermines state capacity by increasing the political 
and financial demands on the state, intensifying competition for resources between 
groups, exacerbating structural imbalances within society, and eroding people‟s trust in 
state-society relations (Homer-Dixon, 1999).  Social segmentation and disruption of 
social cohesion represent major challenges to the state in Homer-Dixon‟s proposition, 
significantly increasing the potential for violent conflict between groups or against the 
state. 
According to Homer-Dixon (1999), structural inequalities within society represent 
the primary cause of environmental scarcity, because they heighten the experience of 
disenfranchisement and inter-group tension.  Structural inequalities are exaggerated by 
two social phenomena: resource capture and ecological marginalization.  Resource 
capture occurs when powerful groups within a society abuse their power by 
“shift[ing]…laws and institutions governing resource access” in their favor (Homer-
Dixon, 1999:15).  Resource capture exaggerates the experience of scarcity for the 
powerless, while ensuring resource security for a small minority.  Ecological 
marginalization arises when politically and economically marginalized groups are pushed 
away from ecologically productive areas toward ecologically fragile areas, which 
increases resource depletion and aggravates the experience of poverty.   
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Violence manifests when individuals or groups perceive other individuals or 
groups as reducing their access to or quality of a resource.  Homer-Dixon explains that 
environmentally induced migration provides a salient example of this, as it exaggerates 
the “we-they” animosities between groups (Homer-Dixon, 1999).  Environmental 
scarcities can also incite violence against the state by creating a “crisis of legitimacy” in 
which “state‟s failure to meet local needs depresses its legitimacy” (Homer-Dixon, 
1999:102) and “people … believe that the state is responsible for their [economic] 
hardship” (Homer-Dixon, 1999:144).  In such cases, people‟s experience of deprivation 
may be so severe that they are compelled to violent reaction against the state.  
Like Homer-Dixon, Kahl (2006) asserts that environmental pressures precipitate 
intra-state violence that occurs in situations of state failure.  Kahl attempts to expand 
Homer-Dixon‟s argument by combining environmental stress, particularly renewable 
resource depletion or degradation, with demographic pressures, such as rapid population 
growth and urbanization.  He explains that demographic and environmental stress (DES) 
overwhelms state capacity, diminishes state revenues, weakens the state‟s reach 
throughout its territory, and creates a security dilemma for the people within the territory 
(Kahl, 2006).  Kahl hypothesizes that DES increases the risk of state failure by 
substantially compromising the capacity and authority of the state and intensifying 
human insecurity, which opens opportunities for anti-state opposition.   While many 
descriptions of state failure include situations in which state elites act violently against 
groups within their domain, Kahl differentiates this type of violence from state failure.  
For Kahl, state failure refers only to anti-state violence or inter-personal violence, while 
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state exploitation encompasses the type of violence that is state-initiated.  In state 
exploitation, the state elites might manipulate their power and their group affiliations to 
incite animosities between groups in such a way as to promote and protect their control of 
power (Kahl, 2006). 
While Kahl‟s hypothesized links between DES and state failure held much 
promise, his assertions fall short.  He appears hesitant about the role environmental and 
demographic pressures in weakening states and accelerating the possibility of failure.  
Although he is right to acknowledge that environmental and demographic pressures can 
never be the ultimate or direct cause for failure, he seems to diminish the importance of 
these factors, even though they form the basis of his argument.  He explains that “even 
when DES plays a role in conflict, it does so as part of a causal chain that results in 
organized violence only when other intervening variables are also in play" (Kahl, 2006: 
58-59).  These intervening variables include the level of groupness within the state and 
extent to which the institutional framework of the state is inclusive or exclusive.  From 
his analysis, civil strife is only likely to occur when there is high DES, coupled with high-
level of groupness and low institutional inclusivity.  More to the point, civil strife as a 
result of DES is unlikely if either of the other two variables are positive.  Kahl‟s own 
analysis identifies these intervening variables as being more influential on the outcome of 
state failure than the extent of DES.   
The most important contribution emerging from Kahl‟s argument is the assertion 
that environmental pressures, combined with demographic pressures, represent “medium 
to long-term sources of state weakness” (2006:44), which are often overlooked as causes 
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because their impact is not immediate.  Kahl‟s premise, along with Homer-Dixon‟s 
asserted relationship between environmental scarcity and violence, will serve as the basis 
for an analysis of the ways in which water insecurity undermines state-society strength 
and makes states vulnerable for failure.  These frameworks are useful because they begin 
to identify the implications posed by environmental strain on state functioning.  However, 
neither Homer-Dixon nor Kahl provides an in-depth discussion of the connections 
between water issues and state strength/weakness. 
State strength and state failure represent inversions of each other, and thus many 
of the indicators for state failure would apply to state strength though in reverse.  For 
example, states experiencing failure exhibit deficiencies in state capacity, high levels of 
human insecurity, and inability of the state to demonstrate authority throughout the 
territory.  On the other hand, state strength can be defined as the demonstrated application 
of institutional capacity, political will, and authority to function in the manner expected 
of states.  Strong states promote the overall well-being and development of society, and 
are exhibit the intention and capacity to ensure physical security and public welfare.  
Strong states typically exhibit vibrant economies, democratic institutions, fewer structural 
inequalities, and general state-nation congruence.  Critical to this author‟s conception of 
state strength is the extent to which the state functions for the betterment of all 
individuals living within its territory.  Therefore, there are four basic areas that promote 
state-society strength: institutional capacity, economic growth capacity, emphasis on 
human development, and human security.  As I will demonstrate, water security 
reinforces each of these areas, therefore providing a foundation to support state strength 
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(See Figure 1).  In contrast water insecurity exaggerates the deficiencies present in fragile 
states and creates a possible breaking point.  
First, institutional capacity represents a critical determinant of the functioning 
ability of a state.  Institutional capacity includes the state institutions, such as ministries 
of education, justice, or finance, as well as contextual support provided to non-
governmental organizations, and existing social norms and practices.  Institutional 
capacity encompasses the ability of state institutions to establish and implement short, 
medium and long term plans, balance conflicting goals or demands, and adapt to 
unexpected events, particularly of large-scale.  Moreover, institutional capacity enables 
the ease of governance and influences the direction of state development.   
As Grey and Sadoff (2007) assert, water security requires functioning institutional 
capacity that allows state planners to identify need; determine optimal approaches to meet 
such need; allocate resources to desired projects; adjudicate disputes between users; and 
monitor infrastructure, water use and water quality.  Therefore, water security entails the 
involvement of numerous departments and groups.  Water insecure states often lack the 
institutional capacity to manage the state‟s water needs, or to adequately handle difficult 
hydrologic environments.  While it may not always be the case, it can be argued that a 
state‟s deficient capacity to address its water security needs reflects an overall deficiency 
in institutional capacity. 
Second, state strength is bolstered by its economic strength and capacity for 
growth.  This includes the level of development and extent to which it is integrated into 
the global economy.  In addition, economic strength necessitates sound policy making 
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and political will.  A state‟s economic growth capacity is further reinforced by its level of 
infrastructure, its ability to collect revenues and allocate national assets, and the level and 
utilization of human capital.  Water security directly benefits a state‟s economic strength, 
as water represents a critical input into most agricultural and industrial activity.  In 
addition, water security supports the advancement of human capital by ensuring that 
individuals have access to clean water, promoting health and productivity.  As with 
institutional capacity, water security requires a certain level of infrastructure, which 
likely denotes that the state has invested in other forms of infrastructure, such as roads or 
utilities.  In addition, water infrastructure is generally developed with the intention of 
harnessing the power of water for hydroelectric energy or to increase agricultural 
productivity.  Therefore, water security serves as a critical driver of economic 
development.     
Third, water security supports the responsibility of the state to ensure the security 
and foster the welfare of the individuals living within their boundaries.  Strong states 
exhibit the capacity and the political will to advance such a goal, which is manifest in the 
level of human development and the extent to which funding and policies are dedicated to 
the areas of education, health, and poverty alleviation.  The literature on development-
security nexus clarifies the importance of promoting a virtuous cycle of human 
development/human security/state-society strength.  Ensuring water security, particularly 
ensuring the basic water needs of individuals, advances human development and 
promotes human security, because access to water is directly linked to improved health 
and improved livelihoods.  Water security for human well-being has been linked to the 
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achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, by assisting in the alleviation of 
poverty, improving nutrition outcomes, improving maternal health, and increasing the 
number of female children in the education system (Palaniappan, 2009).  Water security 
further supports food security and ensures a livelihood for millions of people who depend 
on agriculture or fishery.  In recent years, increases in food prices or concerns with food 
shortages have led to riotous civil unrest in places like India, Tunisia and Haiti, and 
concern has been raised that intensifying water shortages will result in higher food prices 
and more frequent food riots.  Water security clearly supports foundational elements that 
promote state strength and ensure human well-being.   
The implications of water insecurity in states with limited state capacity, 
legitimacy and authority are manifold.  Water insecurity denotes the lack of institutions 
and infrastructure to support development and functional governance.  Water insecurity 
impedes growth capacity, negatively impacts agricultural productivity, and creates a 
massive drain on the productivity potential of individuals.  Lack of access to clean water 
causes unnecessary illness and fatalities, and the collection of water consumes large 
portions of women‟s productive hours and keeps girls out of school.  Therefore water 
insecurity aggravates gender inequality and heightens the experience of human insecurity 
overall.  Moreover, as Homer-Dixon and Kahl assert, water insecurity, particularly water 
scarcity, increases the sense of competition between groups and creates incentives to 
challenge the state‟s authority.  As the capacity gap between what is demanded of the 
state in terms of meeting competing water needs and what the state is able to achieve 
expands, domestic legitimacy erodes and state authority becomes more tenuous.   Water 
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insecurity can create a negative cycle in which fragile and failing states are unable to 
cope with the multiple and competing demands.  
To demonstrate the relationship between water insecurity and state failure, the 
situation of Pakistan will be analyzed.  Pakistan is one of the world‟s most water stressed 
states, and has also been listed on several state failure indexes for over five years.  Unlike 
most failed or failing states, Pakistan does exhibit many functioning institutions, 
particularly its military.  However, Pakistan can be described as one of the most insecure 
security states, because its emphasis on military build-up in opposition to India has been 
to the detriment of all other critical areas of state strength.  Pakistan‟s water crisis will 
place significant demands on the institutional capacity of the state in the next 10 to 20 
years, and has the potential of significantly depressing Pakistan‟s development potential 
for the long-term.    
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CHAPTER 4  
CASE OF PAKISTAN 
 
Up to this point, the discussion has focused broadly on operationally defining 
water security from a state security perspective and from a human security perspective, 
discussing the security-development nexus, and outlining the indicative factors 
underlying state failure.  These indicators include the effectiveness of governance 
particularly in state authority, legitimacy and capacity; the type of regime and openness 
of democracy; the level of groupness or state-nation congruence; level of economic 
growth; the extent of uneven development and structural imbalances; and the level of 
human insecurity.  Additionally, it was proffered that water security underpins and 
reinforces many of the foundational factors that promote state strength.  A conceptual 
analysis was presented that outlined the extent to which water security promotes 
economic growth, the development of institutional capacity and infrastructure, and 
human security and development.  The task now is to demonstrate how these phenomena 
interrelate, and to more deeply explore the implications of water security issues on states 
that are considered at risk of failure.   
Because of its tumultuous socio-political history and its designation as a 
significantly water-stressed country, Pakistan proffers an illustrative example for 
exploring the potential for water insecurity to act as a risk factor of failure.  Pakistan 
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presents a contradiction in regards to the issue of water security and state strength 
because at a surface level, the country has an extensive institutional structure and many 
of the features that would imply a functional state.  However, a deeper analysis of the 
country‟s political development and current political, social and environmental issues 
signify that Pakistan is highly unstable and faces significant challenges to its internal 
security.   
For much of the past decade, arguments have been raised as to whether or not 
Pakistan has failed all together as a state (Jan, 1999; Kumar, 2005; Qureshi, 2005; 
Rotberg, 2010; Singh and Kukreja, 2005).  Analysis of Pakistan‟s political and societal 
development presents a state that has demonstrated persistent political instability and a 
history of authoritarian rule (Husain, 2009; Kukreja, 2005; Talbot, 2009), excessive 
militarization to the point of being a garrison state (Kukreja, 2005; Siddiqa, 2005; Talbot, 
2009; Waseem, 2005; Ziring 2010), ethnic tension and factionalism (Jan, 1999; Malik, 
1996; Talbot, 2009), overt and tacit support for Islamic extremism and terrorist activity 
(Jan, 1999; Singh and Kukreja, 2005; Siddiqa, 2009; Ziring, 2010), and limited 
institutional capacity and political culture due to preference for patronage and personal 
gains (Malik, 1996; Talbot, 2009; Wilder, 2009).  For such faults, Pakistan consistently 
ranks among the top 10-20 failed states by the various failure indexes (e.g. Failed State 
Index, CIPF).  However, some scholars argue that Pakistan is not yet failed, though has 
balanced precariously on the precipice for over 60 years (Malik, 1996, 2008; Qureshi, 
2005).  Arguments against Pakistan‟s failure concentrate on its military power (Qureshi, 
2005) or on a hopeful expectation that Pakistan will overcome its myriad of challenges 
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(Malik, 1996).  Regardless of whether Pakistan has failed, is failing or is perpetually 
weak, Pakistan remains one of the most underdeveloped countries in Asia. 
In addition to its political and social challenges, Pakistan is one of the most water-
stressed countries in the world (World Bank, 2005), as Pakistan withdraws over 40% of 
renewable water sources each year (FAO, Water at a Glance).  Pakistan‟s economy is 
heavily reliant on agriculture, and the country boasts one of the most extensive irrigation 
systems in the world.  However, inefficiency and misuse, combined with anticipated 
climatic changes and rapid population growth, creates an uncertain water future for 
Pakistan that threatens the functional capacity and legitimacy of the state.  The discussion 
below will concentrate on the major political, economic and societal features of Pakistan 
that provide an assessment of the state-society strength.  In addition, a review of 
Pakistan‟s water security issues will be presented.   
 
Pakistan on the Precipice: Political Factors  
Political development in Pakistan has been marred by instability, inconsistency 
and contradictions.  Over the 64 years as a sovereign state, the country has witnessed 
over 33 years of military rule under four leaders, fourteen Prime Ministers, five interim 
governments, and the institution of four formal constitutions (Burki, 1999; Husain, 2009; 
Talbot, 2009).  Illustratively, the average tenure for elected civilian government is 
estimated to be less than two years (Husain, 2009), which creates a political environment 
where the focus is on “short-term political (and financial) gain rather than on achieving 
mid-to longer-term policy objectives (Wilder, 2009:28).  Moreover, the transition from 
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one government to the next was seldom smooth, adding to the experience of instability 
(Husain, 2009; Kukreja, 2005).  Political, social and economic policies rarely remained in 
force beyond the tenure of government (Husain, 2009), resulting in an erratic national 
development. 
The Political Instability Task Force notes that inconsistency in regime type breeds 
instability (Bates et al., 2003), which accurately describes the political history of 
Pakistan.  According to the Political Instability Task Force‟s analyses of political 
instability, weak democracies and weak autocracies are most at risk for political 
instability and potential failure (Bates et al., 2003).  Pakistan‟s governance structure can 
be characterized as both.  According to its founding documents, Pakistan is a democratic 
Islamic state, served by a parliament and headed by a president.  However, the 
development and exercise of open democratic institutions has been severely limited from 
the beginning (Burki, 1999; Saif, 2010; Singh and Kukreja, 2005; Talbot, 2009).  
Historian Stephen Cohen (2004) notes that most of the politically powerful stakeholders, 
including the leaders of the Muslim League, perceived democracy as an attractive idea in 
the abstract, but its practice was deemed to have unsavory consequences for the 
distribution of political and economic power.  At the country‟s birth, Muhammed Jinnah 
declared himself the Governor-General of the new state of Pakistan, and personally 
selected his prime minister and other members of government from members of his elite 
Muslim League (Burki, 1999; Mahmood, 2000).  This tradition of indirectly electing or 
appointing the highest positions of power, the President and the Prime Minister, 
continues in the current Pakistan government (Burki, 1999; Mahmood, 2000).   
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Moreover, most of the governments, whether military or civilian, have assumed 
authoritarian stances once in power, significantly limiting the ability of Parliament to 
interfere with the executive authority (Husain, 2009; Singh and Kukreja, 2005; Wilder, 
2009).  Constitutions have been redrafted or drastically amended to increase the 
executive powers of either the President or the Prime Minister, and limiting the functional 
capacity of the National Assembly and Senate (Burki, 1999; Mahmood, 2000).  These 
tendencies reflect Political Instability Task Force‟s analysis that weak partial democracies 
marked by a dominant executive power with few checks authority and political 
factionalism, are significantly more likely to experience political instability than full 
democracies and even full authoritarian regimes (Bates et al., 2003).   
The penchant for authoritarian, elitist rule derives from Pakistan‟s colonial 
heritage (Saif, 2010; Singh and Kukreja, 2005; Talbot, 2009).  The British annexed the 
northwestern tribal areas and princely states late in their colonial enterprise on the Indian 
subcontinent (Talbot, 2009).  These areas served primarily as a strategic buffer between 
British India and the encroaching Russians, Persians and Afghans (Talbot, 2009).  Rather 
than fully establishing the colonial apparatus that was operating in Eastern Punjab and 
Bengal, the British maintained minimal administrative presence but incentivized loyalty 
and compliance among the various tribal leaders by bestowing land grants, titles and 
other favors (Saif, 2010; Wilder, 2009).  This system was ardently pursued in 
northwestern Punjab, which the British favored because of its proximity to the 
established British India, and because of presumptions among the British that the Punjabi 
people exhibited military prowess and compliant attitudes (Saif, 2010; Talbot, 2009).  
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Lubna Saif, who presents a highly critical analysis of the colonial experience on the 
subcontinent, notes that “western Punjab played the most vital role in strengthening 
colonial rule”, thereby “attaining the status of the „Sword Arm of the Raj‟” (Saif, 
2010:15).  The association between special dispensation and the colonial army created a 
dominant landed aristocracy in Punjab that assisted the British in maintaining law and 
order throughout the northwestern areas (Saif, 2010; Talbot, 2009).  As Talbot and others 
explain, the system of patronage in exchange for loyalty among landed elites 
“discouraged the introduction of representative institutions in the Punjab” (2009:63) and 
created a detrimental imbalance between weak democratic institutions and an excessive 
bureaucratic system (Wilder, 2009). 
The most influential bureaucratic institution in Pakistan remains the military, 
which has entrenched itself in the political development of the state (Kukreja, 2005; Saif, 
2010; Ziring, 2010).  Since Pakistan‟s birth, the military establishment of Pakistan has 
viewed itself as the ultimate defender of Pakistan‟s national integrity, and the 
“benevolent babysitter, watching over Pakistani politics and society” (Cohen, 2004: 61).  
This attitude has led to the excessive militarization of Pakistan, which represents a 
fundamental paradox between Pakistan‟s strength and weakness.  For some, the strength 
of the military props up the state‟s authority and capacity, leading some to question the 
applicability of “state failure” to Pakistan (Qureshi, 2005).  However, as will be 
explained in more detail below, Pakistan‟s emphasis on the military has been at the 
expense of other areas of national development (Kukreja, 2005), and in effect makes 
Pakistan the epitome of an insecure security state.  Lawrence Ziring (2010) classifies 
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Pakistan as a garrison state, and notes that heavy reliance on the military is a sign of 
weakness rather than strength.  The military has been a destabilizing force through the 
thirty years of direct military rule and its influential role during periods of civilian 
government (Burki, 1999; Wilder, 2009).  Moreover, as a carry-over from the colonial 
system, the military cultivates the patronage system as a means of maintaining and 
expanding their influence (Wilder, 2009).  Thus, the military‟s influence in Pakistan‟s 
political system has stifled the possibility for true democratic development.   
The extensiveness of political instability and the influential role of the military in 
politics raise doubts regarding state authority, legitimacy and capacity in Pakistan.  
According to the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, state authority incorporates both 
the traditional concept of monopoly of legitimate use of force, as well as the ability of the 
state to govern its entire population.  While the strength of the Pakistani military implies 
a strong monopoly on legitimate use of force, the ability of the state to govern its territory 
and provide safety for its entire population is questionable, particularly since Pakistan‟s 
involvement in the US war on terror (Rotberg, 2010).  Over the 60 years of its 
sovereignty, Pakistan has had minimal authority in the frontier regions of the Northwest 
Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan, in part a legacy of the 
administrative structure established by the British during the colonial experience (Burki, 
1999; Talbot, 2009; Weinbaum, 2009).  Related, the limited authority in the frontier areas 
of Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Federally Administered Tribal areas 
derives from the high level of state-nation incongruence and the revisionist desires of the 
groups within these regions (Miller, 2010).  The authority of the state has already been 
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successfully challenged by the Bengalis during the 1965-71 civil war, which ended with a 
smaller state of Pakistan and a new Bangladesh.  The state‟s authority continues to be 
questioned by insurgent groups in Baluchistan, and among the Pashtuns in the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (Miller, 2010). 
In addition, the state‟s ability to control its borders and protect its polity from 
home-grown terrorism has been significantly frustrated, despite the fact that Pakistan 
possesses one of the largest armies in the world, particularly for its size.  Since 2001, the 
incidence of terrorist activity has risen drastically (Nayar, 2009; Shafquat, 2009; Siddiqa, 
2009; Weinbaum, 2009).  Baldev Raj Nayar, reporting on level of insecurity in South 
Asia, asserts that, with 2,293 terrorism-related deaths, Pakistan ranked second in the 
world according to the US Counterterrorism Center‟s 2008 Report on Terrorism, behind 
Iraq (Nayar, 2010).  Moreover, while extremist activity and the development of Islamist-
extremist/terrorist groups have previously concentrated in the northwest borders with 
Afghanistan, such activity is encroaching into the more populous provinces and into the 
major cities (Siddiqa, 2009).  The inability of the military in restraining terrorist activities 
reflects a conundrum within the institution regarding the identity of Pakistan as a Muslim 
state (Siddiqa, 2009).  Because the origins of Pakistan were devised as a Muslim state 
independent from a Hindu India, and because of the unfinished task of defining territorial 
borders in Kashmir, the military has both tacitly and directly supported the development 
of Islamic extremist/terrorist organizations that would undermine the authority and 
regional power of its easterly neighbor (Siddiqa, 2009).  Islamist extremist groups have 
not been considered a threat to state security (Weinbaum, 2009).  However, this implicit 
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policy has had significant negative consequences for the security and stability of Pakistan 
(Siddiqa, 2009; Weinbaum, 2009).   
Numerous factors challenge the legitimacy of the Pakistan state, which the 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy defines as “the ability of the state to command 
public loyalty to the governing regime and to generate domestic support for government 
legislation being passed and policies being implemented” (CIFP Fragile State 
Methodology).  Among these factors are the extent to which the military establishment is 
entrenched in national and foreign policy; the extent of state-nation incongruence and the 
level of resentment among smaller ethnic groups toward the Punjab majority; and the 
inability of the state to curb corruption and parochial politics.  Lacking truly democratic 
institutions, the governments throughout Pakistan‟s history, particularly those headed by 
military dictators, have manipulated domestic support to legitimize their rule (Husain, 
2009; Mahmood, 2000).  In many cases, regimes relied on their elitist political bases, 
particularly Punjabi aristocracy and the muhajir population, to legitimize their authority.  
For example, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who declared himself President on 
October 27, 1958, significantly restricted the potential for political participation among 
the general population by establishing the selective Basic Democracy, through which the 
President and government officials were elected (Mahmood, 2000).  This system 
disconnected people from political affairs and intensified the practice of bribery and 
patronage (Mahmood, 2000).  The façade of democracy has also been poorly utilized to 
legitimate other non-elected political leaders.  President Musharraf manipulated elections 
in 2002 to legitimize the presidency he usurped several years prior and to hamper his 
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oppositions‟ political power (Cohen, 2004).  Political leaders also relied heavily on the 
appeal of Islam and Pakistan‟s opposition to Indian hegemony as a means of garnering 
popular support (Husain, 2009).   
As with its questionable authority, the legitimacy of the Pakistani state has been 
tested by the high-level of groupness, and the resentment among the smaller ethnic 
groups toward the majority Punjabis.  Historically, the central government has been either 
unable or unwilling to fully integrate the tribal areas of Pakistan into political culture and 
society (Weinbaum, 2009), and has allowed considerable unevenness in the level of 
development between the Punjab and Sindh heartland and the peripheral regions (Fund 
for Peace, Pakistan Assessment).  In addition, Punjabis have dominated the critical 
institutions of the state, including the military and civil bureaucracies (Wilder, 2009).  
The combination of these features has significantly hindered the state‟s ability to develop 
a wide-spread affiliation to national identity, and has created a detrimental feeling of 
resentment among the various ethnic and provincial groups (Cohen, 2004; Saif, 2010; 
Wilder, 2009).  The separation of West and East Pakistan in 1971 was not only a 
rejection among the Bengalis of Punjab-dominated government, but of the state‟s 
legitimacy.  In addition, the state‟s legitimacy has been challenged by insurgent 
movements among the Baluchis, the Pashtuns, the muhajirs, and Sindhis (Cohen, 2004), 
not to mention the increasing rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups that adhere to a 
different set of moral authority (Weinbaum, 2009). 
State capacity represents a critical characteristic of a state, as it refers to the 
ability of the state to carry out its essential duties as a state and to employ public 
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resources for bettering national development.  Capacity encompasses the effectiveness of 
institutions (Lemma and Cummins, 2010), the availability of fiscal and human capital 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999), coherence between the various segments of government 
particularly regarding a policy agenda (Homer-Dixon, 1999), and the political will to 
enforce policies and foster open environments for development and growth (Lemma and 
Cummins, 2010).  The status of state capacity in Pakistan presents a contradiction.   The 
state possesses all of the requisite governmental institutions and an extensive bureaucratic 
structure, yet Pakistan‟s institutional effectiveness is markedly weak.  According to the 
World Bank‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Pakistan ranked below the 20th 
percentile in governance effectiveness in 2009, and has historically ranked below the 50
th
 
percentile (World Bank).  Corruption is wide-spread, and the predilection of politicians to 
use political office to expand personal prominence has been severely incapacitating.   
Moreover, the judiciary has limited independence from the influence of the executive 
(Cohen, 2004), and political space for civil society has been generally restrained (Bajoria, 
2008; 2009).  The inability of the government to adequately address the insurgent issue is 
one example of Pakistan‟s weakened capacity (CIFP, Democracy and Governance 
Report, 2007).  The inaction of the government in the weeks and months following the 
devastating floods in July 2010 further underscores the ineffectiveness of the government 
to effectively support the public welfare and security of the population (Carment and 
Samy, 2010).  
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Pakistan on the Precipice: Economic Factors 
While the governance structures of Pakistan reveal critical weakness in the 
political stability of the country, Pakistan has maintained relatively robust economic 
growth throughout its young history (Husain, 2009).  Since its birth, Pakistan has 
averaged an annual GDP growth rate of 5.4% (World Bank Dataset), though there is 
noticeable variation between years that appear to coincide with elected civilian 
governments or periods of transition.  Former economic policymaker Ishrat Husain 
(2009) argues that Pakistan‟s relative economic success results from an overarching 
commitment across regimes to a liberal-economic approach, deviated only by Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto in the 1970‟s.  However, other scholars have contended that Pakistan‟s 
economic record hides the state‟s dependency on foreign aid, and have criticized the 
state‟s unwillingness to implement authentic economic reform, including a reduction of 
the military in government expenditures or land reform (Cohen, 2004; Kukreja, 2005; 
Siddiqa, 2005).  Moreover, while the country has witnessed overall economic growth, the 
benefits of such growth have not been distributed evenly across the provinces, resulting 
in continually stunted human development.  Therefore, to measure the strength of 
Pakistan on its average annual growth rate provides an incomplete assessment of the 
economic factors that relate to state strength. 
Historically, Pakistan‟s economy has been dominated by the agricultural sector, 
though the service sector and the industrial sector are now surpassing agriculture‟s 
contribution to the GDP; in 2010, agriculture accounted for 22% of the GDP, while 
industry and service accounted for 24% and 55%, respectively (CIA Factbook).  
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Agriculture still comprises the largest portion of the labor force, directly involving 
approximately 45% of the labor force, and engaging millions more who depend on 
subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods (Farooq, 2010).  Moreover, because much of 
Pakistan‟s industrial sector focuses on processing agricultural products, agriculture 
indirectly sustains a far larger segment of the labor market than official numbers relate 
(Farooq, 2010; World Bank, 2005).  For example, the textile industry accounts for nearly 
half of Pakistan‟s manufacturing and over $4US billion in export revenue (Cohen, 2004).  
Critics have argued that the political instability in Pakistan has disabled the country to 
adequately develop the industrial base and human capital to be competitive in the global 
market (Cohen, 2004; Kukreja, 2005).  
Pakistan‟s economy has been significantly bolstered by the influx of foreign aid 
and investment.  Since the beginning of the Cold War, Pakistan has utilized its strategic 
geographic position on the Asian continent as leverage to obtain financial and military 
aid from the United States and its Western allies (Cohen, 2004; Husain, 2009; Kukreja, 
2005).  In 1954 and 1955, Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), both of which supplied Pakistan with 
substantial financial aid and military arms (Ziring, 2010).  The US War on Terror has 
benefitted the Pakistan economy tremendously, as Pakistan‟s alliance with the US was 
accompanied by debt forgiveness and large inflows of foreign direct investment (Nayar, 
2010).   By some estimates, FDI equaled over one billion US dollars in 2004 (Razmi, 
2009).  Nayar explains that Pakistan‟s growth reflects geopolitics rather than 
globalization (2010:110).   
97 
However, analysts criticize Pakistan‟s ill-use of such income (Kukreja; 2005; 
Nayar, 2010; Siddiqa, 2005), noting that the reliance on foreign aid in particular has 
produced several damaging consequences for the economy.  First, as most of the aid 
came in the form of financial loans, Pakistan has incurred massive amounts of debt, 
which its low tax-base has been unable to balance.  In the early 1990‟s, Pakistan‟s foreign 
debt was reported to be US$38 billion (Kukreja, 2005), while currently external debt 
equaled over US$50 billion in 2010 (Pakistan Ministry of Finance).  Debt servicing has 
represented a significant portion of the federal revenue expenditure.  In the late 1990‟s, 
debt servicing amounted to 78% of tax revenues (Kukreja, 2005); in the 2010 total public 
debt represented over four times total government revenues and 60% of GDP (Pakistan 
Ministry of Finance).   Pakistan‟s debt load has sometimes required additional loans to 
assist in debt repayments (Cohen, 2004; Kukreja, 2005).  A second consequence pertains 
to limited economic policy planning and an unwillingness to commit to necessary 
economic reforms (Cohen, 2004; Kukreja, 2005).  The availability of easy money 
lessened the importance of developing a self-reliant economy.  Only when lenders 
required specific conditions for additional loans were political leaders willing to consider 
mid-term planning that involved privatization and deregulation (Cohen, 2004).  
Moreover, critics emphasize that nearly all regimes have hesitated in enacting significant 
economic reform that would improve the structural imbalances between classes, increase 
the potential of the state to collect revenues, and improve Pakistan‟s level of development 
(Cohen, 2004; Kukreja, 2005).  
98 
The two most significant reforms that have been neglected by every regime 
include land reform and military spending (Cohen, 2004; Khan, 2009; Kukreja, 2005; 
Siddiqa, 2005).  The colonial policies of bestowing land grants and titles to tribal leaders 
and loyal military officials created a politically and economically dominant landed 
aristocracy that has staunchly clung to its power throughout Pakistan‟s development 
(Saif, 2010).  Pakistan‟s political economy has been described as a feudal capitalist 
system (Cohen, 2004; Kamal, 2009; Kukreja, 2005; Saif, 2010), in which power is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of landowners while the majority of the rural 
population is economically marginalized.  While India and other South Asian nations 
enforced significant reforms to redistribute land ownership after the departure of the 
British, the politically entrenched landowners prevented similar measures from occurring 
within Pakistan (Kukreja, 2005).  The landowning class has also stymied economic 
proposals to increase agricultural taxes or incur other revenue from the agricultural sector 
(Kukreja, 2005).  Economist Feisal Khan (2009) notes that while an agricultural income 
tax would generate approximately US$750-875 million in additional revenue, the 
politically influential landed class consistently prevent such measures from passing in 
Parliament.  The inability or unwillingness of the Pakistan government to enforce 
meaningful land reform underscores the state‟s incapacity to ensure the security and well-
being of its entire populace.  Moreover, persistent rural poverty and stunted economic 
development remain the outcomes of this significant structural imbalance in land 
ownership. 
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Throughout Pakistan‟s history, the military has played a central role in the 
political economy of the state, because of Pakistan‟s obsession with its easterly neighbor, 
India.  Since inception, Pakistan has suspected India of seeking to undermine the 
sovereignty of Pakistan.  Rather than assume a passive position, Pakistan‟s sense of 
insecurity and desire to weaken the regional power of India has resulted in an excessive 
buildup of military power.  In addition to expanding its conventional military capacity to 
“match” the strength of India, Pakistan has ardently pursued its nuclear capacity (Siddiqa, 
2005), a costly mission.  The military defense budget represents over 5% of government 
expenditures, though Ayesha Siddiqa (2005) notes that actual expenditures dedicated to 
the military enterprise is not disclosed and represents more than the “one-line figure in 
the national budget” (126).  Moreover, while Husain (2009) argues that the strength of 
the economy has much to do with the strength and independence of the private sector, 
Siddiqa (2005) contends that the military has created a monopoly in the private sector, in 
which the army controls much of the major industries in the country, including financial, 
insurance, construction and manufacturing. 
The allocation of government revenues to the maintenance and expansion of 
Pakistan‟s military capacity, competing with India, has come at the expense of Pakistan‟s 
overall economic and human development.  Siddiqa (2005) reports that, between 1981-
1999, Pakistan dedicated an average of 0.75% of GDP to health, 2.13% to education, and 
6.5% to defense.  Similarly, Cohen (2004) indicates that in 2003, defense expenditures 
represented 55% of the national budget, compared to 36% allocated to developmental 
expenditures.  While Pakistan has been so consumed with its power struggle with India, it 
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has failed to achieve much of the social and economic gains that allow its neighbor to 
maintain regional dominance.  Pakistan ranks as a middle-income country according to 
the UNDP Human Development Reports, 134
th
 out of 177, not far behind India, which 
ranks 126th.  However, India has prioritized human development to a greater extent than 
Pakistan, as noted by the size of government spending on education and public health 
(over 3.5% and 4.5% respectively)  (Nayar, 2009).  Pakistan‟s level of human 
development has remained relatively stagnant for decades.  In 2004, approximately half 
of the adult population was literate, three-fourths of the population lived on less than 
$2/day, nearly a third were below the national poverty line, and there were 80 infant 
deaths/1000 live births (Watkins, 2006).  While GDP/capita has been steadily increasing 
since 1990, averaging approximately US$550, critics argue that the economic growth has 
not been distributed to the poor, but rather stays within the hands of the landlords and 
industrial class (Kukreja, 2005; Siddiqa, 2005).     
Critical to the health of a state‟s economy is the extent to which the state develops 
the productive potential of its population, including education and job opportunities.  
Education indicators denote limited priority on developing a literate and educated 
workforce.  According to the Human Development Report data, literacy for the 
individuals over the age of 15 is approximately 50%, though this is skewed by the higher 
literacy rate among those between the ages of 15-24 which is 66% (Watkins, 2006).  In 
2004, only two-thirds of school-aged children were enrolled in primary school, and 
attrition by grade 5 was approximately 30% (Watkins, 2006).  Education opportunities 
for females remain dismal, as demonstrated by comparatively lower literacy rates (36% 
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vs. 63%) and lower enrollment rates in school (32% vs. 44%) (Watkins, 2006).  As noted, 
public investment in education averages approximately 2% of government expenditures, 
and Pakistan has relied heavily on foreign investment for schools, particularly from other 
Muslim countries (Paul, 2010; Ziring, 2010).  The result of the low investment in and 
management of the education system is “generation after generation if ill-trained and 
barely literate young men” with very few job prospects and “millions of young girls who 
do not receive any serious education, and …are excluded from the formal workforce” 
(Cohen, 2004: 241).   
As noted, some analysts assert that Pakistan has wasted opportunities to create a 
truly robust industrial economy, instead concentrating efforts on the military 
establishment.  While Pakistan‟s official unemployment numbers, at 5.5%, represent 
typical employment levels for most developing and developed countries (Nizami, 2010), 
it undercounts large portions of the population that are either excluded from the labor 
market or who participate in the informal economy.  Given the heavy reliance on foreign 
aid, Pakistan‟s economic development has been stifled much like its political 
development.  Moreover, it signifies critical weaknesses in the state‟s capacity to 
establish and maintain viable economic policy. 
 
Pakistan on the Precipice: Societal Factors 
Pakistan faces several significant demographic and societal challenges, including 
an expanding population, a growing youth bulge, increasing urbanization, and intense 
inter-group factionalism.  These challenges are magnified by the problems of a low 
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emphasis on human development.  As of 2010, Pakistan‟s population was estimated to be 
about 173.5 million people, an increase of 10.6 million people since 2007 (Nizami, 
2010).  Population growth estimates for Pakistan suggest that by 2050, the country will 
have approximately 300 million people (Nizami, 2010).  The increase in population is a 
combination of the persistently high fertility rate and the improvements in health 
indicators that decrease the number of child deaths and prolong adult life (Nizami, 2010).  
For various cultural reasons, Pakistan‟s fertility rate has remained above 4%, the highest 
in the South Asian region (Nizami, 2010).  Cohen (2004) implies that the high fertility 
rate reflects an implicit belief among the political elite that a large Muslim population 
provides a strategic asset against the state‟s national enemy, India.  Concomitant with the 
expanding population, Pakistan‟s demographic distribution is weighing heavily towards 
the youth bracket.  The recent Economic Survey of Pakistan reports that the median age 
of the population is 20, with 104 million people below the age of 30 (Nizami, 2010).  
Such a large proportion of young people presents numerous demands on federal and 
provincial governments, particularly in terms of education and employment.  While 
unemployment for those between the ages of 25-34 is only slightly above the national 
unemployment rate, 6.9%, over 17% of youth between the ages of 15-24 are unemployed 
(Nizami, 2010).  In the absence of quality education, training and productive 
opportunities, many of these youth become prime recruits for extremist groups (Cohen, 
2004; Weinbaum, 2009). 
Urbanization is also creating challenges for Pakistan‟s capacity.  While the 
majority of the population continues to reside in rural areas, Pakistan‟s cities are growing 
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exponentially, due to the prospects of better employment.  For example, the port city of 
Karachi grew by 43% between 1998 and 2010, and Islamabad expanded by 84% to a 
population of 972,669 (Nizami, 2010).  Interestingly, the cities in the more desolate 
provinces, such as Quetta in Baluchistan, and Peshawar in NWFP, have also seen 
significant growth over 40% (Nizami, 2010).  Like in most developing countries, 
urbanization is occurring at a rate faster than public planning can manage, challenging the 
state‟s capacity to provide sufficient housing and straining public municipal services. 
The final critical societal factor challenging Pakistan‟s stability is the high level of 
groupness.  As it has already been mentioned, Pakistan is characterized by high state-
nation incongruence, due to the extensive ethnic diversity and the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to create an overarching bond to national identity.  In 
explaining the increase in ethnic-based political violence during the 1990‟s, Jan (1999) 
notes that “ethnicity has been an underlying factor in Pakistani politics since the 
country‟s creation” (703).  Many of the 90 plus political parties in Pakistan are organized 
along ethnic/regional lines.  Moreover, the exclusivist politics among the Punjab majority 
exaggerates the state-nation incongruence.  In addition to the ethnic factionalism and the 
noted revisionist desires among several ethnic minorities, groupness in Pakistan also 
occurs along sectarian lines.  While the rise in Islamic extremism has much to do with 
Pakistan‟s involvement in the War on Terror, the domestic terrorist activity also reflects 
increasing animosities between Sunnis and Shiite (Jan, 1999; Miller, 2010).  Siddiqa 
(2009) notes that there has been an increase in the number and size of Islamist extremist 
groups operating in Pakistan since the 1980‟s, many of which are motivated by strong 
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religious ideology.  Thus, while the ethnic factionalism has lead to insurgent movements 
against the state, sectarian animosities incite interpersonal violence.   
 
Assessing State Strength in Pakistan 
Pakistan clearly exhibits problematic features that place it at risk of state failure.  
Politically, the Pakistan state predominantly operates as an elitist authoritarian regime 
that at times dons a veneer of democracy.  The extent of political instability within the 
state and the dominant role played by the military has undermined the state‟s ability to 
establish a viable democratic state.  In addition, Pakistan has been inconsistent in 
demonstrating the core characteristics of stateness – authority, legitimacy and capacity.  
While the state maintains a strong military force that denotes authority and legitimate use 
of force, the persistence of terrorist and insurgent groups in the country‟s frontier raise 
questions regarding the state‟s reach.  Ethnic based politics have further weakened the 
sense of state-nation congruence, and undermines the state‟s domestic legitimacy.  
Pakistan‟s erratic governance capacity underscores the extent to which state strength in 
Pakistan is a façade.  The inability of the state to rein in the extremist Islamic groups has 
attracted much attention internationally, and represents a primary reason as to why 
Pakistan has been identified as a failing state.   
Economically, Pakistan presents some qualities of strength.  However, Pakistan‟s 
record of economic growth primarily reflects a heavy reliance on international aid and 
FDI.  Pakistan‟s political economy promotes military investment over investment in 
economic and human development   Pakistan‟s feudal structure and persistent inequalities 
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between the economic classes signifies another risk factor that continues to tip the 
balance toward failure.  In addition, the low prioritization on human development, and 
the rise of extremist Islamic groups has created an environment of high human insecurity.  
Considering these problems, the question remains as to whether or not Pakistan is 
a failed state.  Scholars and policy makers present divergent opinions on this matter.  
Some analysts argue that Pakistan failed in 1971 when East Pakistan seceded from West 
Pakistan (Kumar, 2005).  Others point to the history of political instability and the 
inability of the state to truly establish its authority and legitimacy over the entire territory 
as illustrations of Pakistan‟s continual state of failure (Rotberg, 2010).  The major indices 
of failure and instability rank Pakistan at significant risk of failure.  The Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy provides a dismal assessment of Pakistan in which the 
state‟s heavy militarization and weak governance capacity are clear indicators of state 
fragility and possible failure (Direh, Marchylo, Urban and Wyszomierska, 2007).  The 
Fund for Peace Failed State Index places Pakistan 10
th 
in 2010, primarily because of the 
serious political, social and economic stress caused by high levels of ethnic factionalism, 
the excessive involvement of military in politics, and lack of domestic legitimacy (Fund 
for Peace).   
However, although Pakistan demonstrates signs of failure, some argue that 
Pakistan is not a failing state, because the strength of the military ensures that the state 
carries out its primary duty of providing security (Qureshi, 2005).  Qureshi (2005) argues 
that the state institutions in Pakistan have not failed, but rather it is the ideology upon 
which Pakistan was formed that has failed.  In addition, the argument has been made that 
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Pakistan has not yet failed and will not be allowed to fail because it is too strategically 
important to world powers (Kumar, 2005).  The international community is particularly 
concerned that Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons may be acquired by terrorist groups (Gupta, 
2002).  A failed Pakistan could have serious negative implications for the Central and 
South Asian regions, as well as for global security.  Considering the breadth of evidence 
regarding Pakistan‟s uncertain state strength, Pakistan provides a clear example of a 
stifled state that has been on the precipice of failure since its inception. 
     
Pakistan‟s Water Security Conundrum 
The weaknesses and contradictions manifest in Pakistan‟s political, societal and 
economic structures become even more salient when examining their water security 
status.  Water security has been defined as possessing adequate amounts of quality 
appropriate water to meet current and future need requirements, in a manner that 
sustainably supports ecosystems.  As Grey and Sadoff (2007) have asserted, water 
security requires a base level of infrastructure and institutional capacity to plan for and 
meet water needs, and to adapt to potential water-related disasters.  The ability of a 
country to obtain water security is highly dependent upon its environmental context, or 
what Grey and Sadoff (2007) call the hydrologic legacy.  Using these definitional criteria, 
Pakistan possesses a tenuous level of water security.  Being an arid to semi-arid country 
that is primarily dependent on one major river system, Pakistan already experiences 
challenges in meeting current water needs (Kamal, 2009; Kugelman, 2009; World Bank, 
2005).  In addition, Pakistan‟s infrastructure is antiquated and inefficient, leading to 
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massive wastage (Kamal, 2009).  Little oversight exists to protect against industrial 
degradation of water quality (Kugelman, 2009).  As recent flooding events demonstrate, 
Pakistan‟s government has been ill-equipped to respond to major water-related events, 
resulting in extreme water insecurity for the population.  Finally, though the Indus Water 
Treaty stands as an exemplar of international water cooperation, hydropolitics persist as 
an undercurrent theme in the tensions between Pakistan and its upstream neighbor.  
Given Pakistan‟s propensity to externalize security issues, Pakistan has historically 
blamed its water challenges on India.   
In this section, the extent to which Pakistan faces water insecurity will be 
outlined.  First, I will describe how Pakistan‟s challenging hydrologic environment 
impacts the country‟s water security.  This will include a discussion of inefficiencies of 
Pakistan‟s water infrastructure.  Second, I will present Pakistan‟s external water security 
concerns, namely Pakistan‟s relationship with India and the Indus Waters Treaty.  Third, 
I will discuss the internal issues caused by water insecurity, including the interprovincial 
tensions over water allocation.  Finally, I will focus on the human water insecurity that is 
pervasive in Pakistan.   
 
Ensuring Water Security in Pakistan‟s Challenging Hydrologic Environment  
Pakistan possesses a complex and difficult hydrologic environment, with 
significant climatic and geographic differences across its major regions.  The northern 
areas of Pakistan have some of world‟s tallest mountains, where the headwaters of the 
subcontinent‟s rivers originate (FAO, 2010; Malik, 2008).  Baluchistan and parts of 
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Sindh in the south and southwest of the country are extremely arid, exhibiting different 
desert environments (FAO, 2010).  Punjab and the remaining parts of Sindh have 
benefitted from the Indus River system, which creates an extensive watershed throughout 
these provinces.  Overall, Pakistan has an arid or semi-arid climate, averaging between 
240mm (World Bank, 2005) to 494 mm of rainfall per year (FAO, 2010), though the 
country experiences large seasonal and geographic variations in precipitation and 
temperatures (FAO, 2010).  The desert areas of Baluchistan and Sindh receive less than 
100 mm/year; while North West Frontier Province and northern Punjab average 
approximately 1500mm of rainfall each year.  The winter season is typically drier than 
the summer months, when monsoons bring most of the annual rainfall, and when the 
glacial melts fill the river systems.  April through September, Pakistan experiences high 
temperatures (averaging 38 degrees Celsius), which increases the pace of 
evapotranspiration from crops (FAO, 2010).  In addition, the torrential nature of the 
summer rains limits the rate of natural recharge because the gritty soil cannot absorb the 
deluge.  
The Indus River serves as Pakistan‟s most extensive water source, running 
approximately 2,000 miles from the north-west corner of India through the entire length 
of Pakistan before draining into the Arabian Sea in Sindh.  The Indus River system 
comprises five major rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Beas and Sutlej) which originate 
in the Himalayan regions of India and China, and is also fed by the Kabul River, which 
flows out of Afghanistan.  The entire river basin covers a massive area of 1,138,800 km
2
, 
of which 597,700 km
2
 is situated in Pakistan (Gleick, 2009).  Within Pakistan, annual 
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flows of the Indus River system equal between 138 to142 million acre feet (MAF) 
(Farooq, 2010; PILdat, 2003).  In addition, the Indus Basin contributes to an extensive 
groundwater aquifer, which covers over 16 million hectares (FAO, 2010).  Overall, 
Pakistan‟s total annual renewable water resources are estimated to amount to 233.8 km3 
(Gleick, 2009). 
Estimates for annual water withdrawals indicate an increasing trend in the amount 
of water withdrawn in Pakistan, primarily for agricultural use.  In 1991, total freshwater 
withdrawals were estimated to be 155.6 km
3
, of which 1,991m
3
 was dedicated for 
agricultural use (Gleick, 1998).  In 2000, total water withdrawals were estimated to be 
169.38 km
3
, again dominated by agriculture, which used 1,043m
3
 (Gleick, 2004).  The 
national estimate for water withdrawals in 2008 was 183.4km
3
(FAO, 2010), representing 
approximately 78% of total water resources.  Given Pakistan‟s rising population, water 
availability at a per capita rate demonstrates a similarly alarming trend.  In 1951, with a 
population of 34 million, Pakistan‟s per capita water availability was well over 
5,200m
3
/year (Farooq, 2010).  By 1991, Pakistan‟s per capita water availability was 
estimated to be 1,565m
3
/p/year (Farooq, 2010), below the benchmark level of 
1,700m
3
/p/year proposed by Malin Falkenmark for measuring water stress.  By 2000, per 
capita water availability dropped to 1,072m
3 
(Gleick, 2008), and estimates for 2010 
suggest that per capita water availability averages 1,066m
3 
(Farooq, 2010), indicating that 
Pakistan has become a highly water stressed country.  
Given the limits of its natural water resources, Pakistan has relied on the 
development of water infrastructure for storage and dispersion.  Pakistan possesses one of 
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the most extensive contiguous canal-irrigation systems in the world, much of which it 
inherited from the British colonial system.  According the 2009-2010 Economic Survey 
of Pakistan, the irrigation system covers 42 million acres, and is comprised of three 
reservoirs (Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma), 19 barrages, 12 inter-river linkage canals, 45 
independent canal systems, and 110,000 water courses (Farooq, 2010).  In addition, the 
system utilizes over 42MAF of groundwater that is accessed through 921,229 tubewells 
(Farooq, 2010).  The combined total storage capacity of the three reservoirs equals 18.37 
MAF (Farooq, 2010).  In addition these reservoirs provide 4,662 megawatts of 
hydroelectric power, serving as a major energy source for the country (ul-Mulk, 2009).  
The World Bank extols the unexpected beneficial impacts Pakistan‟s dams have had for 
the country‟s economy.  In Pakistan‟s water assistance strategy (2005), the World Bank 
reported that the actual power and irrigation outcomes were 25% higher than the 
predicted levels.  The report further notes that while increased productivity as a result of 
additional water resources represents a direct benefit of the infrastructure, the role of 
agriculture in the economy implies that the impact likely extended to other sectors that 
directly and indirectly support the agricultural sector (2005).   
 However, numerous scholars and politicians have highlighted the system‟s 
inefficiency.  The storage capacity of the major dams equals approximately 30 days of 
runoff, compared to 900 days provided by the Colorado River dams (World Bank, 2005).  
In addition, due to a build-up of silt, this storage capacity has declined by at least 27%, 
which affects the flows, particularly during the winter season (Farooq, 2010; Kamal, 
2009).  Water loss throughout the canal system presents another problem, as 
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approximately two-thirds of the 114MAF of freshwater sources is lost due to seepage and 
evaporation (Kamal, 2009).  Inundation-style irrigation has resulted in the dual problem 
of water-logging and salinity, both of which have hampered Pakistan‟s agricultural 
productivity (Bengali, 2009; Kamal, 2009; Khan, 2009).  The recent Economic Survey of 
Pakistan notes that agricultural productivity is dismally low, at less than 0.1kg/m
3 
(Farooq, 2010).  Kamal saliently points to the irony of the situation, noting that “Pakistan 
is using 97% of its allocated water resources to support one of the lowest productivities in 
the world per unit of water” (Kamal, 2009: 32).   
Climate change threatens to exacerbate Pakistan‟s productivity per unit and its 
overall level of water security in at least three ways.  First, climate change is anticipated 
to increase the area‟s aridity, lessening the overall annual precipitation rates (Farooq, 
2010).  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall will increase the rate of 
evapotranspiration, which will add to Pakistan‟s salinity problem.  Decreases in 
precipitation will increase the water insecurity for those living in Baluchistan and Sindh.  
Second, while overall the subcontinent is expected to become hotter and drier, climate 
change is anticipated to bring more intense rainfall during the monsoon season, which 
will increase the potential for flooding (World Bank, 2005).  Pakistan‟s dry, silty soil, 
combined with already close to surface water tables (due to irrigation process), make 
difficult the absorption of heavy rains (World Bank, 2005).  Third, climate change 
already affects the rate of glacial melts, which is expected to intensify at a rapid rate 
(Cooley, 2009; World Bank, 2005).  While initially increased glacial melting may 
amplify the amount of river flows, the long-term threat is an overall reduction in flows.  
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In addition, as the flooding in the summer of 2010 demonstrated, seasonal melts have the 
potential to overwhelm the absorption capacity of the rivers. 
 
External Determinants of Water Insecurity 
Pakistan clearly faces significant gaps between water demand and availability of 
supply, gaps which are projected to increase due to changes in the climate, expanding 
economic development, and natural population growth.  However, the national discourse 
regarding Pakistan‟s water insecurity largely focuses outward, toward its upstream 
riparian rival.  Until 1947, the Indus River, and the extensive irrigation system 
established by the British to create a prolific agricultural colony, was a single system 
within one territorial unit.  In addition to the tenuous political and social problems created 
at Partition (Cohen, 2004; Talbot, 2009), the delineation of Pakistan out of the Indian 
subcontinent generated the massive challenge of dividing the waters.  At Partition, 
Pakistan possessed the majority of the canal system; however, the river headwaters 
originated in the Himalayan Mountains in India and China (Alam, 2002; World Bank, 
2005).  The violent migrations and the defiance of the Raj to comply with Partition 
agreements (Cohen, 2004) instilled fear in Pakistan that India would attempt to upend the 
sovereignty of the new state by halting the flows of the rivers.  Indeed, on April 1, 1948, 
less than a year after Partition, the provincial government in East Punjab stopped the flow 
of the Sutlej River, posing significant threat to West Punjab‟s winter and summer crop 
seasons (Alam, 2002).  The contentious and precarious situation between the two states 
eventually led to multilateral negotiations, headed by the World Bank.  After ten years of 
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negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) determined the allocation of the Indus Basin 
rivers between the two countries.   Based on economic development goals for each 
country, the treaty allocated primary control and use of the three western rivers, the 
Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, to Pakistan, while India had control and use of the 
Ravi, the Sutlej, and Beas (World Bank, 2005). In addition, the treaty concretized the 
principles of equity and minimal harm (World Bank, 2005) and established mechanisms 
for information sharing and dispute resolution (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).       
Given that infrastructure and institutional capacity form the structural basis for 
establishing water security (Grey and Sadoff, 2007), the Indus Waters Treaty process 
produced several important outcomes for Pakistan‟s water security.  First, the division of 
the colonial irrigation system forced Pakistan to rapidly develop its own infrastructure for 
storage and regulation of the rivers‟ flows.  The Tarbela and the Mangla Dams are the 
direct result of the dividing of the Indus Rivers.  As noted, the benefits from these dams 
exceeded the expected projections of agricultural productivity and hydroelectric output 
(World Bank, 2005).  In addition to the dams, the treaty made provisions for link canals, 
barrages and tubewells that would increase Pakistan‟s ability to access and manage its 
water resources (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).  Second, the negotiation process induced 
the establishment of institutional capacity for managing the country‟s water needs.  The 
Water and Power Development Authority was established in 1959 for the purpose of 
planning and implementing water resource development projects at the national and 
provincial level (Khan, 2009).  The treaty further promoted the development of 
institutional capacity by requiring Pakistan and India to share information regarding 
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development plans and water quality and to annually assess the stability of the 
agreements (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).     
The Indus Waters Treaty has been touted as hugely successful for transboundary 
water negotiations, and provides validation for the assertion that countries do not go to 
war over water (Wolf, 2004).  Although Pakistan and India have engaged in small-scale 
wars, particularly over territorial disputes in Kashmir, water access and allocation have 
not been a declared objective of these hostilities.  However, the IWT has not allayed the 
suspicions held by Pakistanis that India is “stealing [their] water” (Buncombe and 
Waraich, 2009).  Since the 1960‟s, Pakistan has been wary of India‟s use of the Indus 
waters, blaming India‟s alleged noncompliance to the treaty as the cause of their water 
problems.  An article in the Asian edition of The Independent recently quoted Pakistan's 
president Asif Ali Zardari as saying "The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to 
relations with India” (Buncombe and Waraich, 2009).  Pakistanis are often quick to 
assume the decreasing in the availability of the river‟s normal flows result from illegal 
diversions across the Indian border (ul Haq, 2010).  In recent years, India‟s development 
projects along the rivers have aggravated tensions between the two states.   
Most recently, Pakistan has disputed India‟s construction of the Baglihar 
hydroelectric dam on the headwaters of the Chenab River in Jammu & Kashmir (Ahmad, 
2009; Wirsing, 2009).  Although the Indus Waters Treaty permits India minimal use of 
the western rivers for development purposes, Robert Wirsing (2009) explains that 
Pakistan contested the size and position of the spillways, the amount of potential live 
storage, and the height of the intake tunnels.  The fear was that the dam was intentionally 
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designed to “control the flood discharge of water on a scale… that the IWT had 
deliberately sought to preclude” (Wirsing, 2009:108).  Following procedures outlined in 
the Treaty, Pakistan brought their dispute to the World Bank in 2005 and then to an 
independent arbiter, who adjudicated in favor of India‟s plans (Wirsing, 2009).  Since 
2007, tensions between Pakistan and India over India‟s development plans have 
heightened.  Ahmad notes that Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi 
warned that any failure to resolve the water disputes "could lead to conflict in the region" 
(2009:5).   Others have asserted that the increase in terrorist activity aimed at India in 
recent years, both in Kashmir and in India, has been motivated by Pakistanis‟ anger at 
India‟s use of their rivers (Buncombe and Waraich, 2009; Sharm and Wright, 2010).   
While India and Pakistan have yet to war directly over water, Michael Klare 
(2002) has underscored the role water has played in the Kashmir dispute.  He explains 
that Kashmir provides India strategic advantage over Pakistan, as well as serves as a vital 
source of power for a rapidly growing economy (Klare, 2002).  If India and Pakistan 
were to come to a border agreement in which Kashmir gained independence or was 
annexed to Pakistan, India would “lose its status as the upstream riparian” (Klare, 2002: 
187).  He notes that as populations and concomitant demands for food and energy rise, 
and as available water sources are depleted, direct competition over water will most 
certainly escalate between the two countries (Klare, 2002).  A recent US Foreign 
Relations Committee Report (February 2011) on water scarcity and stability in Central 
Asia concurs that accumulating stresses of climate change, population growth and 
economic development demands jeopardize the sustainability and viability of the Indus 
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Water Treaty.  Moreover, although Pakistan is the downstream riparian, and the weaker 
power, Pakistan has been the aggressor in many the conflicts between the two states.  
Water scarcity that is perceived to be caused by India‟s misappropriation has great 
potential of inciting violent conflict over water. 
 
Internal Determinants of Water Insecurity  
Internally, Pakistan also faces significant water security issues that point to 
weaknesses in the state‟s capacity, authority and legitimacy.  The first issue relates to the 
ethnic and provincial tensions that center on Punjab‟s dominant position in the political 
economy of the country.  As the upstream riparian along the Indus Basin system, Punjab 
has been the primary beneficiary of the irrigation system and the natural flows of the 
waters.  Yet, for decades Sindh, and to a lesser extent Baluchistan and the NWFP, has 
disputed Punjab‟s allocation of the Indus waters.  The 1991 Interprovincial Water 
Distribution Accord, which specifies allocation per province per season, has not allayed 
the animosity.  In negotiating the Accord, mediators relied on average annual flows from 
1977-1982 to account for seasonal variability as well as inter-annual variability in flows 
and projected additional increases to total availability that would result from proposed 
storage (Pildat, 2003).  The total usage amount was estimated to be 117 MAF, which was 
distributed between the four provinces accordingly: Punjab-55.94 MAF, Sindh-48.76 
MAF, NWFP-5.78 MAF, and Baluchistan-3.87 MAF (World Bank, 2005).  However, 
Khan explains that “continuous disagreement over the actual amount of water available in 
the Indus River system” persists “due to the fact that there is simply no reliable real-time 
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data available on actual water flow” (2009:91).  The sentiment among many Sindhis 
alludes to a deliberate malevolence on the part of Punjab to take Sindh‟s waters.  A paper 
by Sindhi Rasul Bux Palljo (2003) provides a summary statement that exemplifies the 
intensity of this sentiment.  He asserts that his paper focuses on  
“the century-and-a-half long illegal, criminal and conspiratorial plunder of 
Sindh‟s share of the Indus Basin Waters, the serious water famine imposed 
upon Sindh, the ruin of its agro-based economy and the apprehended 
genocide of Sindhi people” (2003:4). 
 
While not every Sindhi shares such strong hostility and distrust toward the water 
allocation between Punjab and Sindh, other Sindhi officials have expressed discontent 
regarding the process by which allocations were determined and monitored (Goindi, date 
unknown; Memon, date unknwn; Rizvi, 2000). 
The animosity between the provinces over water distribution and allocation stems 
in part from weak institutions at the interprovincial level that are unable to ensure 
openness and equality during the negotiation process.  The Indus River System Authority 
(IRSA) is the governing body established in 1992 to coordinate water sharing between 
the provinces (Khan, 2009).  Rather than attempt to promote collaboration between 
provinces over sustainable use of the Indus system, the provincial representatives that 
comprise the IRSA maintain loyalty first to their ethnic affiliations, and “rig the system in 
their favor” (Khan, 2009: 92).  In addition, the IRSA has minimal authority, as the 
provinces, particularly Punjab, often ignore the IRSA rulings (Khan, 2009).  While 
provincial allocations for use were negotiated in the Water Accord 1991, Punjab proceeds 
to use the Historic Use Formula of 1994 as their determinant for water usage because it 
118 
apportions a larger amount to Punjab (Memon, 2005).  Although this is in violation to the 
Water Accord, the IRSA has been unable to halt this practice (Memon, 2005).   
Feisal Khan (2009) has addressed a number of additional examples of poor water 
governance and policy making that point to structurally induced water insecurity.  First, 
he notes that investment in water infrastructure is significantly warped in favor of major 
projects (Khan, 2009).  The extensive irrigation system, with all of its canals, barrages 
and linkages, is hugely underfunded and in disrepair (Khan, 2009).  While the system 
requires an annual replacement and maintenance budget of US$0.6 billion, Pakistan 
dedicates approximately US$0.02 billion to water infrastructure maintenance, most of 
which goes to personnel (Khan, 2009:88).  In addition, the inability to pass land reforms 
has denied Pakistan critical funds that can be dedicated to improving the water 
infrastructure that supports the agricultural economy (Khan, 2009).  Moreover, Simi 
Kamal (2009) explains that the concept of water rights does not exist in Pakistan; instead 
landownership determines water ownership and access.  Given that the majority of land is 
owned by a minority of the population, e.g. the landed class, most people‟s right to water 
is denied.  Kamal also underscores the insufficiency of water governance, noting that 
“Pakistan does not have a single national regulatory framework” to provide “effective 
regulation, penalties, or conservation guidelines” (2009:39).  The result is that despite the 
various agreements regarding how water is to be shared, “tail-enders,” like Sindhis at the 
end of the Indus River System, receive disproportionately less water than what is legally 
allocated to them (Khan, 2009). 
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Poorly managed water systems in urban areas represent another structural 
inequality that directly links to human water insecurity. While Pakistan‟s major cities 
have been expanding rapidly, the level of investment into the public works has stagnated.  
Khan reports that in Pakistan‟s 10 largest urban areas, less than 10% of the wastewater is 
treated, and “household and industrial waste [mix] together and directly discharge into 
the nearest waterways” (Khan, 2009:88).  The 2006 Human Development Report paints a 
dismal picture of urban water security.  The report describes the lack of sewage treatment 
plants to limit the contamination of drinking water from human waste and industrial 
effluents, which has caused significant waterborne disease epidemics that pose serious 
public health threats.  Arsenic and other contaminants have been found in the drinking 
water in Lahore, Islamabad and other major urban areas (Chaudhry and Chaudhry, 2009; 
Khan, 2009).   
Such poor investment and oversight in water quality disproportionately affects the 
poor, because they have limited recourse to improve their situation.  The large 
landowners and the urban elite possess the financial resources to install their own 
tubewells to improve the access to water, and can afford to purchase bottled drinking 
water, or purification systems.  The poor depend on public wells, with restricted use, 
which often draw from untreated sources (Kamal, 2009).  These disparities call into 
question the official documentation that reports that Pakistan is well above the target in 
terms of the number of people with improved access to safe drinking water (Watkins, 
2006).  Moreover, the inadequacy of water quality and availability for the average 
Pakistani emphasizes the effects of water insecurity on personal health and well-being, 
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and the extent to which water insecurity will lead to violent reaction.  In his chronology 
of water-related conflict, Gleick (2008) reports that as a result of severe water shortages 
in the spring of 2001, groups in Sindh and Punjab rioted in the streets for several months, 
detonating at least one bomb, and causing numerous injuries.             
 
The Implications of Water Insecurity in a Fragile Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the experience of water insecurity is severe.  The country faces 
significant constraints on the actual availability of freshwater resources, including a 
challenging hydrological environment and rapidly increasing demand.  These 
constrictions pose serious threats to Pakistan‟s food security as well as development 
potential.  Pakistan‟s water issues present a major challenge for a state that already 
exhibits weakened authority, capacity and domestic legitimacy.  The difficulties 
experienced by the state to establish and maintain water security reflects the weaknesses 
in institutional capacity and political will to dedicate significant resources for the 
purposes of development.  Much of Pakistan‟s political and social challenges derive from 
its obsession with India, which has obstructed the state‟s ability to create a strong state-
nation.  By externalizing the cause of water insecurity, Pakistan diminishes the state‟s 
responsibility to react and fulfill its responsibilities to the people.  In Pakistan, the 
cyclical connection between insecurity and stagnant development is hard to ignore.   
Water scarcity is not the only threat to Pakistan‟s water security.  In July and 
August of 2010, Pakistan experienced one of the worst floods in over 80 years. Nearly 
one-fifth of Pakistan‟s total land area was submerged by flood waters that spread 
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throughout the entire country from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Sindh.  The floods resulted 
from intense monsoon rains that fell so rapidly that the hardened earth could not absorb 
the water initially. Once rain water began to be absorbed, Pakistan‟s extensive irrigation 
and canal system were not prepared to handle the flows of water; as the Indus continued 
to swell, the water breached levees and overwhelmed embankments.  This horrendous 
water disaster caused millions of people to lose their homes and livelihoods, posed 
significant health risks from water borne diseases, and resulted in the death of at least 
1,300 lives (New York Times, November 2010).   
Analysts assert that the floods will have a significant effect on Pakistan‟s 
development for years to come (Carment and Samy, 2010; New York Times, November 
2010). The floods destroyed Pakistan‟s immediate crop seasons and further compromised 
agricultural productivity for the near future (Gall, 2010).  Pakistan‟s textile industry is 
also likely to suffer, as the floods washed away substantial portions of cotton crops 
(Ellick, 2010).  The extent of the agricultural loss challenges both Pakistan‟s economic 
capacity, but also human income, health, and food security.  Ensuring the basic needs of a 
population of over 170 million is a huge task.  In addition, the floods devastated much of 
Pakistan‟s infrastructure, including roads, bridges, communication lines, schools and 
health clinics (Gall, 2010).  An analysis of the flood situation through the water 
security/state strength model suggests that this major water insecurity event has the 
potential of critically undermining Pakistan‟s stability. All four major features of state 
strength have been compromised, which overwhelm the state‟s functioning capacity.  
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Pakistan‟s political and social malaise also exacerbated the state‟s capacity to 
adequately respond to the floods.  The government was overtly unresponsive during the 
first weeks of the floods.  President Asif Zardari kept his scheduled trip to France and the 
United Kingdom rather than returning to Pakistan to assess the situation, which incited 
anger among many Pakistanis.  Saeed Shah reported in the Guardian (August 8, 2010) the 
shared sentiment among many Pakistani‟s that the President‟s international trips “created 
an image of an indifferent, arrogant leadership”.  Military officers visited affected areas 
before the Prime Minister, which exaggerated the dissatisfaction with civilian 
government (Shah, 2010).  The civilian government was also slow in providing food and 
other aid, particularly to the frontier regions (New York Times, November 16, 2010). In 
this capacity vacuum, the Taliban and other Islamist groups asserted their influence on 
public opinion by providing necessary food and other aid relief, and disparaging the 
government.  Finally, the intensity of human insecurity and the state‟s capacity gap to 
adequately respond to that insecurity turned people further away from affiliation with the 
state, and more toward their affiliation with their communal groups.  
 Pakistan‟s water insecurity, both its long-term shortages and the recent floods, 
poses a serious risk factor to Pakistan‟s security. Significant investment needs to be made 
to ensure equitable and sustainable water security for both state development needs and 
human development needs.  Considering the climactic challenges Pakistan faces, 
ensuring water security must fulfilled in a manner that emphasizes efficient water use and 
reuse.  Pakistan‟s ambitions to keep pace with its neighboring rival, India, will perpetuate 
Pakistan‟s water insecurity, rather that provide necessary assurances.  While major water 
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projects provide a minimum platform upon which water security is based, such 
infrastructure has little value if it is not maintained and if planning does not ensure long-
term sustainability.  While the water crisis discourse is often directed outward, Pakistan 
must address critical internal issues, such as water sharing among provinces and land 
reform.  As water resources become scarcer, the potential for interpersonal and 
interprovincial conflicts over water will increase.  By strengthening the interprovincial 
water sharing frameworks, this destabilizing factor can be diminished.  In addition, 
implementing land reform will have the dual effect of increasing government revenues 
that can be rededicated to ensuring water security and of improving the structural 
imbalances that result in major gaps in the experience of water shortages. 
 Improving Pakistan‟s water security of course requires functioning government 
institutions. In the years to come, we can only hope that political leaders will set aside 
party politics and personal enrichment for the purpose of securing Pakistan‟s democratic 
foundations.  Such a goal includes opening the political process to the entire population 
and distancing the influence of the military from politics.  The Pakistan government 
needs to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that it can provide for their security and 
public welfare.  Finally, Pakistan needs to liberate itself from its obsession with India.  
This obsession has unwittingly held the country‟s political, economic and social 
development hostage since its inception over 60 years ago.    
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I propose that water security underpins the critical features that 
support state strength, particularly economic and human development.  In contrast, water 
insecurity exaggerates the deep-rooted structural problems that place weak and fragile 
states at risk of failure. To demonstrate this relationship, this thesis reviewed and 
analyzed the literatures regarding water security and state failure.  The proposed 
relationship between water security and state strength is based in part on the security-
development nexus, which purports a mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
security and development.  To further illustrate my thesis, I explored the case of Pakistan, 
which is both a water stressed state, and a state that exhibits many critical symptoms of 
failure.   
Water security refers to having the assurance of having adequate supplies of 
quality water to sustainably meet all current and future water needs.  It encompasses 
having physical and economic access to water resources, as well as having the fiscal and 
human capital to properly manage the resource in an equitable way.  Water security also 
includes the ability to adapt to a certain level of water-related risk, such as droughts or 
floods.  Establishing water security requires a minimum platform of functioning 
infrastructure and institutions that enable states to plan for short term and long term 
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needs, as well as to respond to water-related risks. The composition of the minimum 
platform varies across states, depending on the hydrologic environment and the 
development needs. 
I present a model that attempts to depict the relationship between water security 
and state strength (Figure 1).  In this model, water security supports four major factors 
that bolster state strength: institutions and infrastructure; economic growth capacity; 
human development; and human security.  While water security requires the presence of 
existing institutional capacity and infrastructure, the model suggests that establishing 
water security reinforces other state institutions and infrastructure, because water 
infrastructure and institutions cannot function alone.  Water security promotes economic 
growth because water serves as a critical input into nearly ever socio-economic activity. 
Ideally, as states experience economic growth, financial resources will be redirected back 
to maintain and expand water security. Water security promotes human health, gender 
parity, and improved livelihoods. Water is essential for all biological life, and therefore is 
a prerequisite for human development at the most basic level.  Moreover, ensuring water 
security for human development advances human capital because clean water promotes 
health and productivity.  Ensuring water security, particularly ensuring the basic water 
needs of the individual promotes a broad range of other human security needs like food 
security, income security, and health security.  
In contrast, the implications of water insecurity on state-societal stability are 
multitude.  Water insecurity implies low state capacity, particularly in regards to short 
and long term planning, insufficient institutions, and inadequate infrastructure.  A deficit 
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in water infrastructure and institutional capacity is likely to be symptomatic of broader 
incapacitation across other domains.  The inability to secure water resources hinders 
economic growth and human productivity.  Water insecurity therefore undermines 
economic security for the state, as well as livelihoods, food security, and human health 
and well-being, all of which create a negative feedback loop that can undermine the 
capacity and legitimacy of the state.  Water insecurity places additional stress on 
intergroup relations, intensifying feelings of inequalities between groups, which can test 
the state‟s monopoly of legitimate use of force and increase demands for state allocated 
social welfare. 
Water insecurity is most problematic for failing and failed states, which are states 
that lack functional governments to ensure the safety and well-being of their residents. 
Failed states demonstrate a number of political, economic and social dysfunctions that 
underscore weaknesses in their authority, capacity or legitimacy.  In failed and failing 
states, human insecurity is extreme and human development is stunted.  Therefore, water 
insecurity exacerbates the weak governance and human insecurity. Failing and failed 
states lack the capacity or political will to establish and maintain the minimum level of 
infrastructure and institutions to establish water security and are thus much more 
vulnerable to water-related risks.  Failing and failed states also lack the capacity or 
political will to ensure that the water needs of the entire population are met.  In addition, 
the economic capacity of the state has been hampered because the state has been unable 
to exploit the benefits of water for productive use. Failing and failed states are unable to 
cope with the myriad of competing demands placed on them to ensure equitable water 
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distribution, plan for future water needs, and support other critical securities such as food 
and livelihoods. This unresponsiveness can exacerbate public dissatisfaction with the 
state, further weakening legitimacy and authority. Failing and failed states are also unable 
to mediate intergroup conflicts that may occur over intensifying water shortages.  
Therefore, populations experience growing levels of human water insecurity, and 
subsequent consequences on their health, well-being, and livelihoods, public demand for 
the state to fulfill its obligation to promoting security and public welfare will intensify, 
and possibly overwhelm the state‟s capacity to respond. 
 The review of Pakistan‟s political, economic and societal context reveals a 
country that has exhibited state weakness since its inception.  Unlike most failed or 
failing states, Pakistan does exhibit many functioning institutions, particularly its 
military.  However, Pakistan can be described as one of the most insecure security states, 
because its emphasis on military build-up in opposition to India has been to the detriment 
of all other critical areas of state strength.  In Pakistan, the experience of water insecurity 
is severe.  The country faces significant constraints on the actual availability of 
freshwater resources, including an erratic and dry hydrological environment and 
increasing demand.  Inefficiencies in water management and narrow-sighted economic 
policy making have exacerbated Pakistan‟s problems, and point to overall deficits in 
state‟s capacity.  I have argued that water security underpins state strength by bolstering 
the development of infrastructure and institutional capacity, and by promoting economic 
and human development and human security. Though Pakistan possesses the requisite 
institutions and infrastructure that would suggest that the state meets the minimum 
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security requirement, its emphasis on military competition with India has overshadowed 
all other development investments.  Therefore, Pakistan has not adequately been able to 
exploit the water security for development nexus that would overall bolster their national 
security.  In addition, the recent floods highlighted that Pakistan lacks the adaptive 
capacity to handle water-related risks.  The floods have created a negative cycle in which 
Pakistan‟s economic capacity and infrastructure has been severely damaged, human 
security and human development significantly compromised, and state capacity evidently 
weak.  While much needs to be done in Pakistan to reestablish and strengthen water 
security for the short and long-term, the state‟s capacity gap presents a major obstacle to 
overcome.  
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Figure 1:  Water Security – State Strength Model 
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